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ABSTRACT

“The Latent Enmity of Georgia”: Sherman’s March and its Effects on the Social
Division of Georgia

by
Michael Jason Spurr
Dr. Elizabeth White Nelson, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

In September 1864, Union General William T. Sherman’s Savannah Campaign
targeted the growing animosity between wealthy and poor Georgians when he proposed
that Union forces “arouse the latent enmity of Georgia.” This thesis continues the study
of the March to the Sea by examining the effect of Sherman’s campaign as it pertained to
the social divisions between Georgians. Sherman’s army alone did not ruin the state’s
ability to remain a vital contributor to the war effort, but rather focused upon the already
growing social disputes between Georgians over economic contributions, military
sacrifice, and political support. Even before Sherman’s army arrived, Governor Joseph
E. Brown’s attempts to address the economic and political needs of wealthy Georgians
clashed with his efforts to provide relief and support to poor whites. Consequently,
perceptions of the state government eroded as Brown continued to resist President
Jefferson Davis and the Confederate government’s authority over issues of state defense
and militia control. Although the march resulted in significant damage to the Georgia’s
infrastructure, the greater effect of the March to the Sea emerged from the aggravation of
social and political discord throughout the state and the Confederacy.

iii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In a letter to President Abraham Lincoln on September 17, 1864, General William T.
Sherman discussed the plan of action he had recently proposed to two Georgia
politicians, serving as representatives of Governor Joseph Brown. Sherman told Lincoln,
“I have said to them that some of the people of Georgia are engaged in rebellion . . .
Georgia can now save herself from the devastation of war preparing for her, only by
withdrawing her quota out of the Confederate Army. . .”1 By suggesting that only “some
of the people” were in rebellion against the Union, Sherman perceived growing tension
within the state over support for the Confederacy. As the war continued through its third
year, poor whites throughout Georgia faced desperate economic struggles, and support
for the war effort diminished under the growing burden for families throughout the state.
Sherman’s proposal offered Georgians a chance to remove themselves from the
increasingly unpopular war. To close his letter to Lincoln, Sherman wrote, “It would be a
magnificent stroke of policy if we could, without surrendering principle or a foot of
ground, arouse the latent enmity of Georgia against Davis.”2
Although Governor Brown did not accept Sherman’s proposal, the letter to Lincoln
provides significant insight into the general’s perceptions of Georgia prior to the
Savannah Campaign. From Sherman’s offer and his observations to Lincoln, it is evident
that the internal divisions of Georgia influenced Union military strategy as early as the
Atlanta Campaign during the summer of 1864. Brown’s actions, along with the
conditions of Georgians in the northern counties of the state, created the atmosphere of an
1
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already divided state being further pressured with direct military confrontations. More
importantly, he recognized that this fragile loyalty could be exploited to hinder the larger
Confederate war effort. From Sherman’s perspective, Georgia’s internal divisions
between struggling and wealthy families provided the opportunity to attack the economic
and military strength of the South, as well as undermine President Jefferson Davis’
influence over the individual states of the Confederacy. Sherman’s psychological
warfare impacted not only the animosity between Georgian state politicians and the
Confederate government, but also the resentment between Georgians themselves.
Sherman’s determination to exploit the social divisions within the state, as well as the
Confederacy itself, contributed to the success of the March to the Sea by exacerbating the
animosity between wealthy and poor Georgians.
The Southern, as well as Northern, reactions to the March to the Sea provide insights
into the social conditions of Georgia during the Civil War. Although attention has been
given to Sherman’s campaign for its hard war tactics, examining the campaign from the
perspective of the Georgians who experienced it exposes the internal divisions between
Southerners. In a larger sense, an understanding of Sherman’s psychological warfare
must consider its effects on the wartime unity of Southerners. By mid-1864 the
disproportionate burden on poor Georgians combined with the increasingly tense political
relationships of Georgia’s state government with Richmond. With the Savannah
Campaign, Union forces created an insurmountable obstacle to the already divided state.
This thesis demonstrates that Sherman’s understanding of the South, as well as the
conditions of Georgia leading up to 1864, exposed a weakness that the Union military
was able to exploit through hard war tactics.

2

Until recently, the study of military history consisted primarily of research on military
tactics and political actions. In 1991, Joseph T. Glatthaar published an article claiming
that military studies, particularly on the American Civil War, benefited from the
emergence of the “new” social history. By linking military forces to the “broader themes
in society,” Glatthaar stated that historians gained a better understanding of the social and
historical trends within the “new military history.”3 In 2007, Mark Moyer continued
Glatthaar’s observations by stating that the field of military history can offer insights into
social, cultural, or intellectual history that other fields cannot.4 Moyer wrote, “For
instance, only a historian fluent in military history can properly assess the effects of
social divisions on a nation’s ability to defend itself, for only such a historian knows
which aspects of military power might be strongly affected by internal divisiveness . . .”5
By viewing military history from social and cultural angles, the understanding of war and
its participants becomes more detailed. By incorporating the social history of Georgians
into the narrative of the Savannah Campaign, Sherman’s actions expose and illustrate the
growing economic and political disputes within the state.
As Glatthaar expressed in his article, the study of the American Civil War has
benefited greatly from the introduction of social and cultural interpretations. Civil War
historians have used these methods to further the explanations for the North’s victory and
the South’s defeat in 1865. In his book, The South vs. The South, William Freehling
examines the importance of unionist Southerners throughout the Border States. He
argues that the pro-Union whites hindered the Confederate cause by not engaging in
3
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guerrilla warfare and allowing the Union forces to establish military control.6 Without
this military foothold, the Union military would have been forced to invade and conquer
the border regions, thereby wearing down military resources and testing the morale of
Northerners. By basing his research on the actions of whites in the Border States,
Freehling offers an important explanation for the military defeat of the Confederacy.
Like Freehling, James McPherson uses the ideas of social and intellectual history to
explain the actions of the Civil War. In his study, What They Fought For, 1861-1865,
McPherson argues that northern and southern soldiers interpreted the ideals of the
American Revolution of 1776 in various ways.7 By examining the ideological
motivations behind the war, McPherson offers explanations into the severity and duration
of a war that found the Confederacy numerically and militarily outmatched. Both
McPherson and Freehling succeed in developing the understanding of the South’s
eventual defeat beyond more traditional arguments about men and materiel.
With its unique military tactics and its vital importance to the defeat of the
Confederacy, the March to the Sea also received attention from the new military history
movement. In 1985, Joseph T. Glatthaar provided an important contribution to the study
of the Savannah Campaign by examining the march through the experiences of
Sherman’s soldiers. Glatthaar argues that the hardships endured over three years of
warfare motivated Sherman’s troops to punish southern civilians. The Southerners “had
caused this war and were fully culpable for all the sacrifices and suffering Union soldiers

6
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had endured throughout the war.”8 This reasoning allowed Sherman’s men to justify
foraging raids of the Savannah Campaign and South Carolina.
Glatthaar’s research explains the personal experiences behind the march which
provides insight into how the campaign was understood and carried out. For example,
despite Sherman’s orders, many soldiers did not discriminate between the wealthy and
poor civilians.9 By showing the personal experiences of the Union soldiers, Glatthaar
explains how destruction could be continued or rationalized, regardless of the orders from
commanding officers. Glatthaar provides a significant contribution to the narrative of
Sherman’s march by researching the campaign through the experiences and
interpretations of the soldiers. Although his book remains one of the most important
studies on the campaign, Glatthaar’s approach has yet ot be applied to those on the on the
other side of Sherman’s March, the Southern civilians. His exhaustive research on the
Union soldiers, while important, provides little insight into the social conditions facing
Georgians. It is time to tell the other side of this story. Glatthaar’s method of using the
techniques of social history needs to be employed in a broader interpretation of the
campaign.
Mark Grimsley’s study The Hard Hand of War places the Savannah Campaign within
the larger context of the Union military policy throughout the war. According to
Grimsley, the March to the Sea represented a tactic of “hard war.”10 As the Union
military under General Ulysses S. Grant recognized the continuing sacrifices of the war,
it became evident that the Confederacy would not be defeated by open warfare on the
8
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battlefield. Northern victory would require raids and attacks on the economic and
industrial capabilities of the South. Grimsley writes, “Grant expected to combine
destruction of Southern armies with the destruction of Southern war resources.”11
Another important aspect of Grimsley’s interpretation is that it considers the political and
social influences on the Union’s military strategy. Under President Lincoln, the military
strategy in the early war years emphasized conciliation and a three-way division of the
southern population. With pressure from the government and the northern press, military
leaders continued to differentiate between Unionist, passive, and secessionist civilians
throughout the war.12 While Grimsley’s study provides a significant contribution to the
understanding of how the march fit into the Union policy, as well as how it was shaped
by political and social expectations of the North, it ignores the developments of the social
tensions within Georgia. Grimsley’s interpretation of Sherman’s campaign attributes the
planning to Grant’s understandings of the need for hard war tactics. He views the
civilians and state leaders of Georgia as powerless entities, waiting for the Union military
to attack, rather than active participants in the development of the state’s war effort.
Muting their role in the march’s history, he has little incentive to consider the South’s
social conditions. Like Glatthaar, Grimsley contributes an intriguing study that furthers
the military narrative, yet still downplays the importance of Georgia’s social tensions.
Recent scholarship on Sherman’s march continues with the emphasis on social and
political history, established in the studies by Glatthaar and Grimsley. Anne J. Bailey’s
War and Ruin provides an interpretation of the march that focuses on the decisions
leading into the march, as well as the evolution of Savannah’s place within the war effort.

11
12
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Bailey argues that for Georgians during the Savannah Campaign, the march represented
an episode “unparalleled in their immediate past.”13 Bailey presents the culture and
development of Savannah, arguing that the city’s inhabitants lived in an almost naïve
isolation from the war prior to Sherman’s arrival.14 Bailey’s examination of the social
conditions throughout Georgia is important, yet she fails to address the growing social
discord that hindered the state from as early as 1860. She relegates most of the social
history to the beginning of the study, while the remaining chapters rely on political and
military documents to construct a descriptive narrative of the march. Although more
examination of Georgia’s social division is needed, Bailey’ work constitutes a study that
successfully combines military narrative with an interesting, albeit brief, examination of
Georgia’s social history.
Jacqueline Glass Campbell’s When Sherman Marched North from the Sea discusses
the actions of Sherman’s army after the completion of the Savannah Campaign. Through
personal diaries and letters Campbell presents Sherman’s completion of the Savannah
Campaign and beginning of the Carolina Campaign through the experiences of civilians,
soldiers, and slaves. Declaring that war is “culturally sanctioned violence,” Campbell
advances the study of Sherman’s troops and their campaign through the issues of gender,
race, and cultural understandings.15 She credits southern white women for resistance
against Sherman’s troops and argues that the destruction to homes and villages allowed
women to perceived themselves as “political actors,” similar to their husbands who were

13
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fighting on the battlefield.16 Campbell offers a fascinating insight into the experiences of
poor whites in North Carolina as Sherman’s troops entered the state. Viewed as a threat
to the social order and as proponents of desertion, the wives of yeomen farmers faced
abuse from deserters and conscription officers.17 Interestingly, Campbell argues that
Sherman’s arrival in North Carolina served to solidify resistance against the Union,
despite the years of social discontent throughout the state.18 She attributes most of the
credit to Governor Zebulon’s ability to inspire civilians through speeches that vilified the
Union.19 Most of her research, however, seems to come from the records of home guard
units, various women who habitually chastised desertion in their home villages, and other
patriotic civilians. It neglects the growing frustrations of women who faced desperate
conditions prior to Sherman’s invasion and encountered an even worse situation with the
arrival of Union troops in the state. Although her study focuses predominantly on
Sherman’s troops after the Savannah Campaign, Campbell provides an impressive
discussion on the social and cultural conditions of South Carolina and North Carolina in
1865. Through this narrative, the actions and decisions of Sherman’s forces can be
studied in the broader context of the war. This thesis will begin that process of
reexamining the campaign through the social conflicts of Georgia during the Savannah
Campaign.
The development of military history studies on Sherman’s campaign suggests that the
integration of social history into the narratives allows the march to be understood more
thoroughly. The studies by Bailey and Campbell offer small insights into the social

16
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turmoil developing in the Confederacy. Georgia’s social divisions, however, still remain
a separate discussion for historians. While military studies use the accounts of civilians
during the march to support or disprove the severity of Sherman’s actions, little
discussion is offered on the importance that animosity between slaveholders and
nonslaveholders had upon the development and execution of the campaign. Studies on
the class divisions within Georgia are few. In his research on the yeoman farmers of the
northern counties that constituted the Upcountry, Steven Hahn argues that the war tested
the social systems between rich and war. He writes, “The cause of the Confederacy
would bring rich and poor into closer quarters than ever before, demand an
unprecedented level of discipline and sacrifice on the part of each, and exact devastating
tolls on the battlefield and the home front.”20 Hahn continues by suggesting that the
fundamental differences between slaveholders and nonslaveholders over economic
systems and personal ideology of secession hindered the war effort. The lack of food
supplies and manpower emanated from the animosity between rich and poor Georgians.21
Hahn concludes his discussion on the war by stating that “The Confederacy ‘died’ largely
under the weight of inherent contradictions and class conflict.”22
Steven Hahn’s study is not the first to attribute the Confederacy’s defeat to the failure
of interclass unity throughout the South.23 Two recent studies continue the discussion of
class conflict in the South by focusing on Georgia. In 2003, David Williams, Teresa
Williams, and David Carlson’s study, Plain Folk in a Rich Man’s War, examined the
20

Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the
Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 116.
21
Hahn, 123.
22
Hahn, 132.
23
See also Bell I. Willey, The Plain People of the Confederacy, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1943); Paul Escott, After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate
Nationalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); Richard E. Beringer, et. al Why the
South Lost the Civil War, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1986).

9

emergence of class division throughout the war. They argue that by studying Georgia’s
extensive economic and social diversification, it is possible to see that the Confederacy
faced defeat as early as 1860.24 The exhaustive research in Georgia’s local newspapers
and correspondence to Governor Brown from struggling whites portrays the image of the
Confederacy’s strongest manufacturing and agricultural state being weakened from the
inside through incompetence by state politicians and ignorance from wealthy planters.
Although the contribution made by this research into Georgia’s social divisions is
impressive, the authors go to great lengths to portray the image of a planting class that
cared very little at all for the war effort. Few examples, if any, offer any insight into the
ideology of planters who did serve in the war and contributed their economic materials.
The study also gives little attention to the Savannah Campaign, offering only a paragraph
of discussion into the most significant military event of the war for the state. Like the
previously discussed military studies, the research presented in this study clings to one
historical field, and fails to give attention to the military events that influenced the state.
In 2005, Mark Wetherington continued the discussion of Georgia’s internal divisions
by focusing on the lower counties of the Piney Woods region. Wetherington also
suggests that the economic and social stratification of the state hindered the war effort.
He argues, however, that previous historians of class made the mistake of relegating the
war to a conflict over the property of slaveholders and nothing else. To Wetherington,
the internal divisions of the state occurred between individuals rather than social
classes.25 By late 1864, the military threat of Sherman’s forces caused many regions in

24
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the state to revert to the sentiments held in 1861. The slave belt towns produced more
men than the nonslaveholding regions of the state, whose inhabitants largely remained
home or deserted in the early years of the war.26 Wetherington is successful in his
portrayal of the importance that internal division held for the war effort. Unlike the
previous study, Plain Folk’s Fight gives greater agency to yeoman farmers and
nonslaveholding whites. In both studies, the internal discord of Georgia presented an
insurmountable challenge to the early unification of the state. By November 1864, the
dissension created a weakness in the psychological and economic support for the
Confederate war effort.
By observing Sherman’s campaign within the context of Georgia’s social
experiences, this thesis presents the march as an attempt to exacerbate an already growing
weakness. In combining the military actions of the war with the social developments of
the state, the research presented in these chapters offers a shift in perspective. To do so it
reconsiders familiar sources. The political correspondence of Governor Brown, military
orders of General Sherman, and newspaper reports from throughout the state have been
used for previous arguments on the social and military history of Georgia and the Civil
War. This thesis reexamines these documents and provides a new understanding of the
experiences of Georgians leading into Sherman’s campaign. By doing this, Sherman’s
intentions for the campaign may be compared to the actual events of the march, thereby
displaying that Sherman’s understanding of social animosity played a vital role in the
decision to continue through the state. Due to his descriptive writings, Sherman’s
memoirs and correspondence provides an important source for understanding life in
Georgia prior to the campaign. Southern newspapers offer significant insight into how
26
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the state interpreted the invasion and to what extent the discussion of social conflict
emerged. Many of these documents, particularly from Sherman’s papers, are familiar to
the narrative of the war. By engaging them with an eye to class discord, these documents
portray the effect Sherman’s march created on the development of social animosity in
Georgia.
Chapter Two discusses the political disputes between the state government of Georgia
and the Confederacy during the war. Governor Joseph Brown’s reputation as a strong
advocate for state’s rights has been already been examined by scholars. However, his
arguments with Jefferson Davis throughout the war offer insight into the development of
Georgia’s social tensions. Brown recognized the division taking place throughout the
state during the early debates over secession and worked to provide a unified state by
claiming that both slaveholders and nonslaveholders benefited from the protection of
slavery. As the war continued, Brown’s constant arguing with President Jefferson Davis
hindered the state’s defenses by complicating the control over state militia units. This
strained relationship demoralized Georgians, who felt Brown’s attention was too directed
towards high-level political arguments and away from more pressing state issues.
Chapter Three examines the internal disputes between poor and wealthy Georgians
during the initial years of the war. Throughout Georgia, frustrations emerged over the
continuing cotton production of planters despite the growing need for military and
civilian aid by 1863. With supplies decreasing and food shortages affecting poor whites,
Georgians also faced increased prices on goods from speculators. Although Governor
Brown recognized the increasingly desperate economic situation developing throughout
the state, the government could do little to provide relief to struggling regions and

12

counties. By 1864, frustrations over the rising prices and short supplies would convince
many poor Georgians that the war required deep sacrifice from them but with little
benefit or relief from the planting class. By the beginning of Sherman’s Savannah
Campaign, the state’s disputes over the war and the necessary sacrifices were clearly
established.
Chapter Four examines the reasons leading to the decision of the Union army to
exploit Georgia’s internal dissension. For General William T. Sherman, the Savannah
Campaign emerged from his earlier experiences with hard war tactics. While recognizing
that the Union forces could damage the South’s most industrial state, Sherman also
observed the potential destruction that might result from exploiting the internal discord
throughout the state. Sherman’s understanding of the situation developing among
Georgians by 1864 suggests that the psychological targets of his campaign went beyond
the basic fear of invasion and destruction. A Union army foraging on the Georgia home
front placed a difficult burden on wealthy planters and simultaneously created
insurmountable difficulties for poor whites. The chapter continues the discussion of the
social tensions within Georgia by observing its role within the Union military policy
under General Sherman.
In Chapter Five, the effects of Sherman’s Savannah Campaign demonstrate that the
previous weaknesses developed into disastrous problems for the Georgia home front.
The foraging done by the Union Army, while leaving many planting families in difficult
situations, created dire conditions for poor families, mostly through direct foraging and
confiscating food, as well as through the lack of relief efforts that emerged after the
campaign. Many wealthy planters continued to plant cotton, and wealthier regions of the

13

state criticized desperate whites for appealing to the Union forces for aid. The desperate
situation on the home front resulted in desertions from the Confederate armies and the
formation of guerilla and unionist groups in the northern and southwestern regions of the
state. By early 1865, many Georgians blamed the state government and Governor Brown
for its inability to act. The social divisions from the early years of the war could no
longer be ignored. The social cohesion that leaders like Brown worked to establish never
materialized, and by 1864 provided the Union military with a vital weakness to exploit
the Confederacy.
For Sherman, the “latent enmity” of Georgia appeared to come from two levels of
contention. Initially, the internal frustrations between Georgians from as early as 1860
offered the Union army the immediate goal of exploiting the already broken home front.
Sherman’s application of psychological warfare not only created fear throughout the state
but also intensified the growing animosity for poor whites against the wealthy elites. In a
larger sense, however, the discord also applied to Georgia’s role in the Confederacy.
Governor Joseph Brown’s strained relationship with the Confederacy created a weakness
that Sherman hoped to take advantage of by bringing the war to the defenseless state.
The March to the Sea in 1864 represented not just an invasion to destroy the South’s most
important supplier of men and materiel, but an attack on the social and political
weaknesses of the Confederacy.

14

CHAPTER 2
“THOU CANST SAY WE DID IT!”: EARLY POLITICAL DEBATES AND
THE SOCIAL DIVISIONS OF GEORGIA
Governor Joseph E. Brown’s decision, in 1863, to fill unit vacancies rather than leave
the decisions to President Jefferson Davis, became the latest in a series of debates
between Brown and the Confederate government over military authority. General Cobb
hinted at the devastating effect of Brown’s argumentative behavior when he ordered
Brown to “issue no commissions to fill vacancies unless they are forwarded through these
headquarters; otherwise you destroy all military rule and discipline and demoralize the
troops under my command.”27 Cobb warned that “I need not say to you the course you
propose to pursue will bring the Confederate and State authorities into direct conflict, and
endangers, if it does not destroy, the efficiency of the State Guard service.”28 Between
1860 and 1864, the Georgia governor continually resisted and argued with Confederate
leaders over matters of state defense, militia control, and weapons contributions. While
attempting to preserve his state’s control over its soldiers, Joseph Brown ultimately
hindered Georgia’s ability to provide the Confederacy with military support. Although
Brown considered his emphatic support of state’s rights to be beneficial, the constant
struggle between the state and national government damaged the Confederacy’s ability to
supply its troops and eventually weakened Georgia’s state defense in the latter years of
the war.

27
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By contesting Confederate authority over Georgia’s military contributions to the
broader war effort, Brown exemplified the internal problems of developing Confederate
nationalism. Closer examination of Governor Brown’s resistance to the national
government adds to our understanding of the complex events that contributed to the
Confederate defeat in 1865. Scholars have shown that the sentiments of southern
nationalism remained fragile throughout the war. In 1978, Paul D. Escott argued that the
failure of the Confederacy to establish a unified sense of identity fell on Jefferson
Davis.29 Escott argued that because of Davis’ inability to work effectively with members
of the Confederate Congress or state governments, Davis isolated and demoralized
southern political leaders, as well as southerners on the home front and in the armies.
Cobb’s letter, however, demonstrates that the demoralizing nature of the conflict between
Brown and Davis resulted from the decisions of the state government, as well.
Another interpretation of Confederate nationalism argues that the southern states
possessed little, if any, nationalistic pride and as the burdens of war grew heavier, the
support for a centralized government failed to emerge.30 The government under Davis
represented the central government that many state political leaders hoped to avoid with
the newly formed Confederacy. As the conflict continued, Davis’ attempts to facilitate
the necessary political and military decisions only convinced state leaders that their fears
of a strong central government were being realized. This interpretation appears to
explain the conflicts between Brown and Davis, but it fails to consider the internal
economic and social struggles influencing the Confederacy on the state level. In her
study, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism, Drew Gilpin Faust argues that the
29
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Confederacy attempted to establish a sense of nationalism by “incorporating both the
powerful and the comparatively powerless into a negation of the terms under which all
might work together for the Confederate cause.”31 According to Faust, the war forced
Southerners to address previously ignored issues of wealth and social status. With the
war, however, poor Southerners experienced increasingly disproportionate burdens that
brought forth the realization that economic and social hierarchies were not as strong as
previously thought. As the sacrifices of poor whites continued to swell, the political
arguments for the benefits of slavery increasingly failed to convince poor Southerners of
the costs. Ultimately, the Confederacy faced the dilemma of producing class interests
that were synonymous with national interests.32
In order to explore how the political disputes between the state and national
government in Richmond developed, it is important to consider the social developments
within Georgia during the early years of the war. Brown’s actions demonstrate that the
political leadership of Georgia recognized clear divisions in the population’s support for
the war. The war needed to be portrayed as a beneficial endeavor to all Georgians,
despite the difference in sacrifice and potential gain. While he attempted to garner
support among wealthy Georgians by disputing Confederate authority over conscription,
officer enrollment, and troop deployment, Brown developed frustrations among the poor
whites of Georgia, who witnessed increasingly favorable conditions for the rich.
Ultimately, Brown’s disputes succeeded only in delaying troop movements and
withholding precious weaponry for the Confederacy. His political decisions hindered the
involvement of the Confederate military in the state’s defense and demoralized the poor
31
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whites of Georgia, who viewed the governor as being focused on political disputes rather
than the defense of the state. Because of the political arguments put forth by Governor
Brown, by late 1864 Sherman’s forces encounter a state that possessed little defense and
a demoralized population.
The research in this chapter adds to the understanding of social animosity in Georgia
by showing that morale within the state decreased as the disputes between the state and
national government hindered state defense. Although the disputes between Brown and
the national government, as well as between Brown and the state legislature, have been
examined in prior scholarship, the arguments over political authority offer a new way to
examine the social make-up of Georgia. The debates about secession, Brown’s
arguments with Richmond, and the failure to coordinate early military actions increased
disappointment and frustration with the state government. Several regions of the state
offered serious opposition to possibility of secession as early as 1859; the state
government needed to unify Georgians at the beginning of the war.33 With the attention
of politicians going towards the establishment of new national policies and preparing for
defense, the efforts to develop social unity suffered.34 In Georgia, isolation from the
main theatres of the war offered a temporary reprieve for the state. As Sherman’s forces
advanced in 1864, however, the failure of Brown and the state government in
Milledgeville became obvious.
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Political division in Georgia emerged before the state seceded from the Union.
During debates in the capital of Milledgeville, representatives continued to disagree over
whether to approve a call for secession. On November 13, 1860, Robert Toombs urged
the legislature to avoid any further delay and approve the secession ordinances
immediately. Claiming that “nothing but ruin will follow delay,” Toombs anxiously tried
to convey the urgency for quick action.35 The following evening, Alexander Stephens
delivered an address calling for a sense of honor and preservation. A supporter of
continued unionist efforts, Stephens declared, “Whatever fate is to befall this country, let
it never be laid to the charge of the people of the South, and especially to the people of
Georgia, that we were untrue to our national engagements.”36 This was soon followed by
a near riot as secessionists hurried to take the podium in response to Stephens. Antisecessionists, known throughout Georgia as “cooperationists,” were satisfied with the
success of Stephens’s speech, as well as a similar message delivered by Benjamin Hill.
According to historian William Freehling, this early success became highly detrimental to
the Unionist cause because it galvanized supporters for secession, who claimed that the
dilemma of northern superiority could not be solved through passive resistance.37
The debates show that Georgia remained intensely divided over the idea of secession
going into 1861. For Governor Joseph Brown, the political divisions symbolized a
separation of social groups that needed to be unified if the state was to secede
successfully. Originally a Democratic lawyer from northern Georgia, Brown published a
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response to Alexander Stephens’ speech. Popular with poor whites because of his
promises of economic development, and with plantation owners because of the protection
of slavery and state’s rights, he declared that resistance against Republican control
needed to be solidified:38
We all, rich and poor, have a common enemy. It is no time to be wrangling about
old party lines. Our common enemy, the Black Republican Party, is united and
triumphant. Let us all unite.39
Brown continued by warning against the dangers attendant to the abolition of slavery,
arguing that the “poor, honest laborers of Georgia can never consent to see slavery
abolished, and submit to all the taxation, vassalage, low wages, and downright
degradation, which must follow.”40 For the Governor, all Georgians possessed a vested
interest in protecting the current labor system. By appealing to the social changes that
abolition would bring, Brown’s speech portrays the dilemma that faced secessionist
leaders throughout the South. Political leaders needed to develop a sense of unity against
the Union while convincing poor whites to sacrifice for the preservation of an economic
system that favored wealthy slaveholders- but potentially offered the possibility of social
advancement for nonslaveholding whites. The General Assembly eventually approved a
bill authorizing the election of delegates for January 2, 1861, with a convention to be held
on January 16.
For many Georgians, the decision to hold a convention only intensified divisions
throughout the state. By early 1861 secessionist supporters still lacked the majority
needed to carry the convention. Cooperationists throughout Georgia faced intense
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scrutiny from local newspapers.41 On January 14, 1861, the Macon Daily Telegraph
published an article suggesting that cooperationists submit to the overwhelming majority
of Georgians who favored secession. The article asked “Cooperationists of Georgia, will
you not heed these suggestions, and let the Empire State of the South, in her convention
next Wednesday, stand as a unit on the great question of Independence? Our cause is one
in the same, and so let our action be.”42 Many sections of the state, however, continued
to resist the calls for southern independence. Another article from Upson County, located
in western Georgia, claimed that any warfare resulting from secession would cause little
guilt among the citizens of Upson. The article declared:
If the demon of civil war is to ravage our fields only to fertilize them with
blood—we know our Upson Delegates will be able, at the last dread account, to
stand up with clean hands and pure hearts and exclaim through no chattering teeth
from coward consciences:--‘Thou canst say we did it!’”43
As the convention drew closer, Brown continued to emphasize the importance that
slavery held for both slaveholders and nonslaveholding Georgians. On December 7, he
delivered another address demonstrating his unyielding support for the secessionist
movement. In it, Brown displayed many of the qualities and ideas that would
characterize his positions as governor throughout the Civil War. Referring to President
Lincoln and the Republican Party as “our enemies,” Brown stated that the election only
promoted the rise of northern unity against southern rights. The institution of slavery was
in imminent danger, and the elimination of slavery would only harm the social fabric of
the state. Brown suggested that freed blacks would become socially and economically
desperate, resulting in the hindrance of white society. He wrote, “They [freed slaves],
41
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too, must become tenants, with the poor white people for they would not be able to own
lands. A large portion of them would spend their time in idleness and vice, and would
live by stealing, robbing, and plundering.”44 Brown’s statements continually referred to
the decline of social morality that would result from freed slaves continuing throughout
the South.
By late 1860, as movement for secession increased, the hesitancy by Georgia’s
politicians became apparent throughout the South. States with strong secessionist
movements, such as Mississippi and Alabama, sent representatives to every southern
state.45 To quell cooperationist groups, particularly in Georgia and North Carolina,
secession commissioners were sent in November and December with the purpose of
persuading the remaining politicians who questioned secession as a viable option.
William L. Harris, who had been sent by the governor of Mississippi to speak to the
divided Georgia legislature, championed the cause of secession. A former Georgian,
Harris was known for his ability as an orator and was considered by many to be the
authority in creating support for secession. On Monday, December 17, Harris spoke to
the Georgia General Assembly. He referenced the numerous “atrocities” committed by
the Northern government, and described the current discrepancies with the United States
government, including a conspiracy to change the racial hierarchy of southern society by
including blacks. Northern abolitionist groups, he observed, felt empowered with the
recent election of Abraham Lincoln and were planning not only to abolish slavery, but
also promote equality among southern whites and freed slaves. He proclaimed, “Our
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fathers made this a government for the white man, rejecting the negro, as an ignorant,
inferior, barbarian race, incapable of self-government, and not, therefore, entitled to be
associated with the white man upon terms of civil, political, or social equality.”46
According to descriptions from the Macon Daily Telegraph, the Assembly received the
message with great enthusiasm.47
Although regions of the state remained unconvinced of the need to secede,
Harris’s speech embodied a growing tension developing between whites throughout the
state. Heightening this tension, and raising the volume on urgent calls for secession, was
the threat of slave uprising. Beginning in October 1860, reports of slave plots within the
plantation sections of the state increased.48 Josiah Hilsman, the head of a local
investigative committee in Hickery Grove, Georgia, wrote to the Macon Daily Telegraph,
describing an incident in which a Pennsylvania native attempted to inspire local slaves to
revolt. According to Hilsman, “With regard to the whole event, no regular plans were
formed, no active demonstrations were made, and though mischief was manifestly
intended, all was happily prevented by an accidental discovery.”49 The article, although
stating that nothing occurred in regards to a slave uprising, served as a warning of the
precarious situation throughout the state. Lynch mobs formed in Savannah and attacked
freed blacks, slaves, and even poor whites accused of encouraging revolts. One free
black, Joseph W. Ribero, was whipped twenty-eight times by a mob for apparently
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convincing slaves to revolt on the day of Lincoln’s inauguration.50 The fear of slave
insurrection served as a catalyst for the argument that secession was the only means of
preserving public safety.
Although the anxiety about slave revolts increased dramatically, citizens in the
remote areas of the state remained unconvinced that secession was a necessity. Antisecession rallies were held in the northern and southwestern portions of the state,
including Fayette, Gordon, Chattooga, Talbot, and Meriwether counties.51 For poor
whites in these regions, secession symbolized a defense against the loss of property and
wealth for slaveholders, rather than the entire white population. This realization
coincided with a change in the way supporters articulated their defense of slavery. In an
article from the Macon Daily Telegraph on January 18, 1861, the movement to oppose
slavery was criticized for its inability to cooperate with the secession fervor. The article
suggested that “Surely they [anti-secessionists] need not be told that since secession is a
measure settled, their interests, along with ours, lie in making it a strong a movement as
possible.”52 The language of the article shows that two definite groups emerged by early
1861 and that public perceptions of secession differed over the economic and political
interests of Georgians.
Despite the rise in anxiety over possible slave revolts, the belief that poor whites
fought to preserve the racial hierarchy is difficult to completely justify in Georgia’s
economically and socially diverse population. Historian Clarence Mohr suggests that,
50
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beginning in 1860, there was a shift from the consideration of slavery as an economic
vehicle to one of scientific significance for the continuation of social norms.53 Freed
blacks and slaves were considered racially inferior, socially inept, and detrimental to the
continuation of decent society. With this scientific “evidence”, Mohr argues that the idea
of secession effectively engaged working-class whites by appealing to the possible
horrors of introducing an inferior race into society. However, Mark Wetherington argues
that 51% of the common folk of southwestern Georgia voted for secessionist delegates
only after careful consideration of economic and personal situations.54 Other poor whites
agreed with Hinton Helper’s 1857 book, The Impending Crisis of the South, in which he
argued that slavery held down wages for working-class whites and eliminated economic
progress for the South.55 Although fears over slave insurrections did produce an increase
in secessionist attitudes, poor whites in Georgia remained unconvinced and hesitated to
vote for secession in order to defend the racial hierarchy.
As Governor Brown’s correspondence with other southern politicians shows, he
recognized the opposition that secession faced from groups of Georgians. In a letter to
John Gill Shorter, a commissioner from Alabama, Brown acknowledged the presence of
possible anti-secession sentiments throughout the state. He observed:

While many of our most patriotic and intelligent citizens in both States have
doubted the propriety of immediate secession, I feel quite confident that recent
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developments have dispelled those doubts from the minds of most men who have,
till within the last few days, honestly entertained them.56
The passing of another ordinance of secession, Brown went on to suggest, would aid in
the belief that the “Black Republican” party of the North under Lincoln will prove fatal to
the continuation of state’s rights. Brown warned that “other Southern State should not be
deceived to trusting to such a government in future.”57 Later, Brown expressed his
enthusiastic support for the decision of the Alabama state government to organize a
convention to approve secession. Brown wrote, “I trust that Alabama will not hesitate,
but will act promptly and independently, relying, as I know she may, upon the cordial cooperation of Georgia in every hour of trial.”58 Even in Brown’s attempts to glorify the
passage of the secession ordinances throughout the South, the very real prospect of
incomplete political support continued to threaten the South.
Georgia voters decided upon delegates to the secession convention on January 2,
1861, and continued to display an obvious division over the idea of secession. During the
delegate election, anti-secessionists controlled the popular vote by a count of 42,474
against the 41,717 votes in support of separation.59 While the popular vote reflected a
significant resistance to secession, the results of the elected delegates portrayed a
different idea. Officials in twenty-eight counties conspired to change their votes against
the initial platform for which they were elected. While less than a third of the population
of Georgia owned slaves, eighty-seven percent of the delegates in Milledgeville were
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slaveholders.60 For these delegates, the economic and social benefits of secession
outweighed any consideration for the non slaveholding population. On January 18, 1861,
the ordinance for secession was passed by a vote of 208 to 89.61 Drew Gilpin Faust
argues that because southern politics rested in the “carefully balanced equilibrium”
between slavery and widespread prosperity, “many ruling-class Southerners anticipated
strategic advantages in challenging this equilibrium on behalf of their own particular
political goals.”62 With the states facing drastic changes, both politically and socially,
secession conventions provided wealthy leaders with the opportunity to establish a
Confederate nation based on their economic and political agendas.
Despite the divisions leading into the convention, Georgia needed to prepare for the
possible conflict with Union military forces. Initially, the Georgia state government
instituted military preparations for the state. While the State Assembly and Governor
Brown disagreed over economic affairs, both parties acknowledged the importance of
maintaining Georgia’s military defenses. In late 1860, before the vote for secession,
Brown authorized the state to raise ten thousand troops for the state militia. The General
Assembly also appropriated $1 million for military defense spending.63 During this time,
Brown established a powerful role in the formation and control of the state militia units.
Brown selected Henry C. Wayne as the state’s adjutant and inspector general. Three
separate state armies were established and strategically placed throughout the state.64 As
historians William Scaife and William Bragg suggest, Brown’s interest in the early
60
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formation of the state’s defense allowed him to exercise his control over state’s rights and
power. By involving himself in the early organization of the state militia, Brown
established a leadership role that would be tested as Confederate military needs increased
throughout the war.
The first major issue to confront Brown’s authority as the commander of Georgia’s
militia, and in a larger sense the role of state’s rights, was the question over the authority
of military operations. On March 1, 1861 Confederate Secretary of War Leroy Pope
Walker described the latest measure passed by the Confederate Congress. Walker
informed Brown that Confederate President Jefferson Davis was now “authorized and
directed to assume control of all military operations in every State. . .”65 The act stated in
several sections that direct military authority, including the troops, arms, and ammunition
produced within the states, fell under the control of Davis.
Despite a perceived usurpation of power, Brown agreed to the government’s request
to protect against the Union forts on the coastline. Having been ordered by the General
Assembly to organize two regiments for the state’s defense, he immediately sent the
newly enlisted troops to Fort Pulaski and Pensecola.66 Although Brown supplied the
regiments to Walker, he sought to ensure that the regiments would continue to operate
with the officers he had selected. According to Brown, the soldiers who enlisted in the
state’s militia units did so with the understanding that state appointed officers would be
given to the regiments.67 He complained to Walker that, “I cannot, in justice to the
65
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privates that have enlisted, tender the regiments unless they are received with the officers
I have appointed. . .”68 While the War Department did accept these regiments, the
rejection of several lists of state officers, many without any troops or formal regiments
for service, angered Brown.69 After sending another three thousand troops on April 8 to
Pensecola, Brown informed Secretary Walker that, “Georgia will at all times be ready to
do her part, but she will insist on having her rights and wishes respected when she is
claiming the recognition of a principle of justice to her troops, as well as of obvious
propriety.”70 While still supplying the Confederacy with regiments, the perceived
infringements on Georgia’s rights reinforced Brown’s concern over potential abuses by
the national government.
With the attack on Fort Sumter on April 12, concerns over the coastal defense along
the shores of Savannah provided another reason for Brown to insist that troops remain in
the state. After fulfilling another request for 3,000 troops, Brown wrote a letter to
Secretary Walker, describing the urgent situation facing wealthy Georgians. Brown
declared that “There are a vast number of negroes along the coast, and there are several
inlets where the vessels of the enemy can enter without hindrance and carry off this kind
of property in large quantities . . . If you will make the requisition, I will furnish the
troops promptly.”71 For Brown, the presence of slaves and property for wealthy
Georgians justified the use of immediate military action, with little argument over troop
authority. He continued by reminding Walker that “I have met promptly every
68
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requisition made on me for troops for the defense of our cause in other States. . .” Brown
also sent the letter to Alexander Stephens and Howell Cobb in an effort to convince the
Confederate government of the dangers facing the Georgian coast.72 Walker eventually
responded by extending the troops under General Lawton towards the Savannah coastline
but withheld major reinforcements.
The early decisions of Joseph Brown display the untested role of state’s rights within
the new Confederacy. The immediate issue of war with the Union influenced Jefferson
Davis in his decision to engage all executive authority in order to solidify political control
and military defense.73 By establishing his role early in the war, Davis created concern
among state’s rights proponents, who feared the Confederate government developing the
same abuses as the United States. As the war continued, further military needs became
more difficult to meet as critics of Richmond feared for their state’s autonomy.74 For
Brown, the military isolation of Georgia allowed him to exercise greater opposition
against Davis. This opposition, however, hindered military operations in the initial years
of the war and complicated Georgia’s ability to obtain economic and military support by
late 1864.
As Brown continued to resist national authority over Georgia’s military contributions,
the Confederacy struggled to develop the military in response to the impending conflict.
Another act, approved by the Confederate Congress on May 8, 1861, granted the
President the power to organize, develop, and train militia units without a formal request
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to the state. In a letter to Secretary Walker, Brown regarded the act as a “very dangerous
infringement of State rights.”75 The numerous military units that Georgia provided led
Governor Brown to declare that the Confederate government had no authority to claim
control over state militia affairs.76 To combat the requisition of his troops, Brown issued
a proclamation stating that Georgia regiments could not leave the state with arms and
ammunition previously reserved for the militia. Brown insisted that “I can in no degree
increase dispatch in organizing regiments, as you have ordered from the Augusta Arsenal
to Virginia all the new weapons, with which, I think Georgia troops should have been
armed.”77 Even Robert E. Lee, recently placed in command of the arriving units in
Richmond, urged Brown to provide weapons after noticing that “many of the Volunteer
companies from Your State have arrived at Richmond without arms.”78 Despite the
urgent situation facing the newly formed Confederacy in 1861, Brown’s concern over the
authority of Georgia’s troops and supplies took precedence.
Brown’s message to the General Assembly on November 6, 1861, depicted the
growing concerns he had about the government in Richmond. According to the
Confederate Constitution, Brown argued, the control and selection of regular officers is
“appointed by the government under whose authority it is raised.” With the state militia,
however, “the same unrestrained power is not granted.”79 Brown justified this reasoning
by describing the possible dangers that might arise from an executive possessing
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complete control over a country’s armed forces. In times of political and economic
chaos, civilians would submit to political and military leadership. The executive would
therefore have a, “fearful advantage over those who might attempt to prevent the
accomplishment of his designs.”80 Brown greatly feared the commissioning of officers
by the President, again without the formal approval of the state executive.81 Brown
argued:
While the States have delegated to Congress the power of organizing, arming and
disciplining the Militia, and of governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the Confederacy, they have expressly reserved to themselves the
appointment of officers, and have therefore expressly denied to Congress the right
to confer that power on the President or any other person.82
Brown continued by describing the perceived dangers facing the state. He attributed the
naval blockade and the military invasions in Virginia to Lincoln’s desire to punish
Southerners. Because of these perceived attacks, Brown suggested that, “Our lives, our
liberties, our wives, our children, our property, our all, are at stake in this contest.”83
Brown also stated that the defenses around the state needed to be improved, and
Confederate resources were not being given. As early as 1861, he proclaimed that since
the Confederate government failed to provide adequate support, “I am of opinion that the
State will be compelled in a very great degree to take her own defences into her own
hands . . .”84 For Brown, frustration emerged over the constant supplies and contributions
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from the state but a perceived lack of effort from Richmond in promoting the state’s
defenses.
For Brown, the 1862 Conscription Act symbolized an even greater abuse of power by
President Davis. With the expiration of one-year enlistments threatening to drain the
southern armies of vital manpower, the Confederate Congress ordered all men between
the ages of eighteen and thirty-five to serve for three years.85 An article in the Richmond
Examiner praised Davis and the Confederate Congress for dealing with the military
necessity before desperate events forced the action, suggesting that “It is eminently
proper that the regiments now in the field be filled up before new ones are formed.”86
Brown sent Davis an immediate response, claiming that the state had filled the required
number of regiments and weapons. He wrote, “The Conscription Act not only puts it in
the power of the Executive of the Confederacy to disorganize her [Georgia’s] troops . . .
but, also, places it in his power to destroy her State Government by disbanding her lawmaking power.”87 In several letters between April and July 1862, Brown continued his
defense of the unconstitutionality of the act. By the end of the debate, Davis claimed that
“I cannot share the alarm and concern about State rights which you so evidently feel, but
which to me seem quite unfounded.”88
Beginning in 1861, the political actions and reputations of Georgia politicians
convinced many in the Confederacy that the state, despite its impressive industrial and
economic output, provided weak support for the cause. In May 1861, Howell Cobb
informed his wife that “there is a fair prospect of a quarrel between President Davis and
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our worthy Joe Brown. The latter is trying to ride the high horse about certain acts of
Congress which take out of his hands all control of the Georgia troops.”89 Cobb’s
sarcastic remarks show that even in early 1861, Brown’s reputation as a political
hindrance to the Confederacy already established itself in the opinions of southern
leaders. Later, on November 30, 1862 John Beauchamp Jones, a clerk for the
Confederate government in Richmond, wrote in his diary about the election of Hershel V.
Johnson, a unionist from Georgia, to the Senate. Jones commented that “The election of
Graham, Confederate State Senator in North Carolina, and of H. V. Johnson in Georgia,
causes some uneasiness. These men were not original secessionists, and have been the
objects of aversion, if not of proscription. . .”90 Jones also noted the growing frustrations
developing, not just in Georgia but throughout the Confederacy. He continued in his
entry to admit that “From all sections of the Confederacy complaints are coming in that
the military agents of the bureaus are oppressing the people; and the belief is expressed
by many, that a sentiment is prevailing inimical to the government itself.”91 Jones’
observations show that throughout the Confederacy, frustrations towards the government
in Richmond and its military officers surfaced. In addition to the widespread reports of
animosity developing as a result of the Confederate officers, Jones acknowledged the
election of men from Georgia caused uneasiness because of their reputations as being
hesitant supporters of secession.
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As the war continued, Georgia’s military isolation eventually ended and led to further
disputes between Brown and the Confederate government. In June 1863, Davis requested
that the states develop home guard regiments. The Confederate War Department
suggested that these state units would allow Confederate regiments to move to the front
lines and replace the growing number of casualties, rather than guard supply lines or
riverways.92 Although Georgia had been asked to produce 8,000 volunteers, Governor
Brown, thrilled by the prospect of raising more militia regiments that could defend the
state, eventually organized 10,000 by September 1863.93 As the state guard units
developed vacancies from enlistment terms and exemptions, however, Brown again
argued with the War Department over the authority to institute replacements. Brown
insisted that the authority to assign vacancies in state regiments went to the state
governor.94 As suggested in General Cobb’s letter to Brown, urging him to reconsider his
proclamation on the issue, the public dispute between Brown and Davis demoralized the
state militia. Brown’s criticism of the Confederacy received notice throughout the
various parts of the state. In her diary, Katie Cummings, a Confederate nurse in northern
Georgia, discussed the recent proclamation from Brown that warned Georgians against
taking in “refugees and runaway negroes.” She wrote that there “is no good reason why
the good and patriotic people, who have been driven from their quiet homes by the
ruthless foe, should be insulted in this manner. I really think that the character of the
good people of Georgia has suffered from this half-distracted governor.”95 As Brown
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continued to demonstrate animosity towards Richmond, the problems of militia
appointments and helpless refugees convinced many Georgians that Brown placed more
emphasis on political disputes than state organization and defense.
With the growing threat of Sherman’s forces in mid-1864, Brown anticipated the end
of the State Guard enlistments by encouraging the State General Assembly to order all
men between the ages of sixteen and sixty into the militia.96 During this time, however,
the Confederate Congress passed another act requiring all men between seventeen and
fifty to return to Confederate military service. The state legislature possessed the power
to dictate which officers would be exempt from service and under the direction of Brown.
The legislature declared that all civil and military officers excused from Confederate
service would be offered positions in the state militia. General Cobb wrote to the
Adjutant-General, Samuel Cooper, informing that “If Governor Brown had complied
with the requirements of the law of Congress . . . we should have had several thousand
more men in the service than we can get under his proclamation.”97 Rather than adhering
to the Confederate legislation, Brown excused precious manpower from serving in the
Confederate armies.
While the state government continued to quarrel with the Confederacy over officer
appointments, Georgia’s defenses suffered. In an effort to solidify the defense of the
coastal town, Major General Lafayette McLaws attempted to organize militia units for
Confederate service. Brown, convinced that any Confederate use of militia units be
under his orders and commanded by his appointed officers, only offered the regiments if
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McLaws would agree. McLaws complained that “A great objection to Governor
Brown’s organization is that they are controlled by very incompetent persons. . .”98 With
Sherman’s capture of Atlanta, the militia units under General John B. Hood were sent to
Griffin, where numerous men were ordered to return home after being viewed as
physically unfit for military duty.99
The disputes between Brown and Richmond came to a head over the discharge of
state militia units on the eve of Sherman’s march. The anticipated march through the
state caused Secretary of War Seddon to request that Brown’s 10,000 militiamen,
currently serving in the defense of Atlanta, be placed under the command of General
Hood. Brown, however, ordered that the militiamen be sent home after the fall of Atlanta
and perceived Davis’ order to be yet another attempt to remove control from the state. In
a letter to Secretary Seddon in November, Brown deflected the blame for Georgians’
growing frustration by writing the following:
Your assertion, that my past action and public expressions have given
encouragement to our enemies, to the mortification of many patriotic citizens of
the Confederacy, may be properly disposed of by the single remark, that if we
may judge of the encouragement of our enemies by the general expression of their
public journals, the President gave them more delight, hope and encouragement. .
.100
Brown refused to acknowledge the effect that his public confrontation with Confederate
government. Instead, as the public perceptions of Brown worsened with his release of the
militia units, Brown defended himself by suggesting that the northern newspapers placed
the blame on Davis. The important aspect of Brown’s letter to Seddon is that the
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constant disputes over troop authority, public morale, and state authority still remained,
despite Georgia’s precarious situation with Sherman.
With the onset of Sherman’s Savannah Campaign, Governor Brown’s inability to
adequately work with the Confederate government hindered the state’s defenses. In his
diary, Confederate clerk John Jones remarked that the Senate had passed a resolution that
required Davis to produce “a statement on the number of exemptions granted by the
Governors . . . Perhaps it will hit Governor Brown, of Georgia, also; but Sherman will hit
him hardest. He must call out all of his fighting people now, or see his State ravaged
with impunity.”101 To Jones, Davis’ report on the number of exemptions would force
Brown to use all of his militia units. If it failed to do so, Jones expressed confidence that
Sherman’s march would convince Brown to employ all of his resources. It is important
to recognize that Jones’ comments display a public perception of Brown withholding
fighting units, which by late 1864 were badly needed by the Confederate armies. By
early 1865, the feud between Brown and Davis convinced Georgians that the governor
placed personal arguments before the state’s defense. In an anonymous letter to General
Cobb, a citizen of Georgia claimed that “If our Governor could know the feeling of the
people he would assemble the Legislature and have a large army of negroes in the field . .
. The Governor will be however satisfied if he can get a chance to abuse President Davis.
. .”102 Brown’s constant disagreements with Davis convinced the author that a factor in
Brown’s refusal to arm slaves emanated from a desire to resist Davis’ recent approval of
incorporating slaves into the Confederate forces. Brown’s decisions and errors created
the atmosphere of a national government struggling to unite under the pressures of war.
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As social and economic weariness furthered the divisions between wealthy and poor
Georgians, Governor Joseph E. Brown’s resistance to the military policies of the
Confederacy created the military weaknesses that would hinder Georgia’s defense against
Sherman in 1864.
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CHAPTER 3
“IF WE DO NOT, IN MY OPINION, WE ARE RUINED”: THE EARLY DIVISIONS
BETWEEN PLANTERS AND POOR WHITES
On March 25, 1862, the Macon Daily Telegraph published an editorial discussing the
“secrets” southerners needed to discover before achieving independence. Largely
directed at “the rich man”, the article implored wealthy planters throughout Georgia to
resist selling crops at high prices while poor families starved. “You must throw open
your corn cribs and meat houses to the poor,” the author argued, “you must open your
pocket books and generously shell out your dimes to the families of poor men fighting for
you.” Southern independence was unattainable without support for poor farmers. The
author continued by declaring that “This desire of one half of our people to make fortunes
out of the war by eating up the other half must stop.” The newspaper concluded by
reminding planters of Proverbs 11:26; “He that withholdeth corn, the people shall curse
him; but blessing shall be upon the head of him that selleth it.”103
The article demonstrated the growing perception in Georgia that wealthy planters
hindered the war effort by placing economic gain before the state. Furthermore, the idea
that poor whites fought the war for the benefit of slaveholders was emerging by early
1862. For Georgians, the attempts by political leaders and slaveholders to promote a
unified war effort faltered in the intense unionist counties of the north and southwest.
Many poor whites remained unconvinced by the arguments for secession. As animosity
over speculation and failing relief policies hindered what little early war enthusiasm did
emerge, the unity of Georgians grew increasingly strained. By 1864, this division
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provided the Union military with an opportunity to exploit the home front. Exploring the
process of social division allows for a deeper understanding of the events leading to
Sherman’s Savannah Campaign.
This chapter continues the discussion of Georgia’s social divisions by observing the
growing tensions that developed as the war continued. As discussed in the previous
chapter, Brown’s public disagreements with Davis hindered the defenses of the state and
demoralized Georgians, who grew frustrated with the state government’s inability to aid
its citizens. In addition to the political frustrations, Georgians experienced worsening
divisions over issues of the continuation of cotton production despite the needs for
agricultural production, speculators and their influences on food prices, as well as the
inability of the state government to provide relief. As the war continued, these issues
provoked the realization that the war placed an increasingly disproportionate burden on
poor whites, with the perception that planters did little to provide aid and relief to their
struggling neighbors. By late 1864, the social divisions that emerged from the economic
disparity provided Sherman with a clear opportunity to exploit the tense relationships
between wealthy and struggling Georgians.
Scholars of Sherman’s march have paid little attention to the social and economic
struggles between poor and wealthy Georgians. Previous military studies focus on the
campaign’s destruction and significance in the Union’s strategy, with the only discussion
of civilians added to further the understanding of the devastation’s magnitude.104
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Likewise, research on class divisions in the South neglects the direct impact of military
engagements on the social unity of Southerners, and often portrays campaigns as being
separate from the social context. In many studies, only the high number of casualties and
the ensuing burden on economic and military resources are significant aspects of warfare.
Even studies of class in the war-weary regions of Virginia only examine such factors as
family loyalty, class within the Confederate army ranks, and political control by
Unionists.105 The situation in Georgia by late 1864, however, offers a vital opportunity to
view class relations among southerner civilians and their direct effect on the Union
military strategy. Sherman observed that the early war animosities between wealthy and
poor Georgians created weaknesses that the Union army could exploit.
From the beginning of the war, the internal divisions of Georgia provided Sherman’s
forces with an opportunity to exploit the home front of the state. This goes against the
understanding that southerners suffered from gradual “war weariness.” Previous
scholarship on the issue of class conflict within the Confederacy suggests that the South’s
internal division emerged as the conflict worsened.106 According to this theory, poor
white southerners sacrificed in greater numbers on the battlefield and suffered desperate
economic conditions as the war continued. Faced with insurmountable burdens, many
poor whites deserted the Confederate forces, stole food to feed starving families, or
refused to give supplies to military officers. The research on class in the Confederacy
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focuses on the emergence of frustration and demoralization as a result of a war that
benefited the wealthy but required the overwhelming sacrifice of poor whites.
Although Sherman’s campaign is credited by scholars for employing an effective
psychological attack on Georgians, a deeper understanding of the specific impacts of this
warfare need to be understood. Recent social histories studies of Georgia suggest that
poor whites displayed opposition to the Confederacy at the earliest discussions of
secession.107 These historians, although contributing valuable information to the field,
fail to consider the ways in which these social divisions provided an opportunity for
Sherman to exploit the state’s social weakness. To be sure, Sherman’s decision to strike
into the heart of the state largely resulted from the importance of Georgia’s
manufacturing to the South.108 But, Sherman understood the tensions within the state and
recognized the possible advantage for the Union war effort by convincing Georgians,
“who are not overly loyal to the South,” that the war was lost.109
Georgia presents a useful case study of wartime social animosity because of its
uniquely diverse economic and social system. In order to understand the divisions
between wealthy and poor whites in Georgia, however, the social relationships of the
Civil War South need to be examined. Various definitions of “poor whites” have been
offered by historians. Frank Owsley describes “plain folk” as people who formed a
social group behind planters but above poor whites. Owsley argues that poor whites
constituted a small portion of the southern population and that the South held a large
107

David Williams, Teresa Crisp Williams, and David Carlson, Plain Folk in a Rich Man’s War:
Class and Dissent in Confederate Georgia (Gainesville, Fla., 2002); Mark V. Wetherington, Plain Folk’s
Fight: The Civil War & Reconstruction in Piney Woods Georgia (Chapel Hill, 2005).
108
See, Bailey, 24-33; Grimsley, 172-175. Both Bailey and Grimsley discuss Sherman’s
correspondence to Grant and Lincoln, which suggest that Sherman believed the Confederacy to be ruined
with the loss and destruction of Georgia.
109
Letter from William T. Sherman to Ulysses S. Grant, September 20, 1864, Memoirs of William
T. Sherman (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 483.

43

middle class made up of small slaveholding farms, as well as tenants, squatters, and farm
laborers.110 By 1860, nearly half of the one million residents in Georgia were slaves. Of
the free inhabitants of the state, most were involved in agriculture, although only half
owned three or more acres of land. The remaining whites were tenant farmers,
sharecroppers, and day laborers on other lands. While most of the landholders did own
slaves, only a third of them owned more than ten. On the eve of the war, the planter class
made up only 3 percent of Georgia’s population111 Owsley’s definition of poor whites
was expanded by Edward Magdol and Jon L. Wakelyn in 1980 to include country store
owners, urban mechanics, day laborers, and factory workers.112 In two recent studies,
Stephanie McCurry and Mark Wetherington define “plain folk” as white southerners who
owned ten or fewer slaves and fewer than 150 acres of land.113 This more inclusive
definition fits this study because Sherman’s planning depended on foraging from all
civilians.
Although the number of plain folk greatly outnumbered slaveholders, maintaining the
racial hierarchy remained an important aspect of life. For this reason, nonslaveholding
whites supported the institution of slavery even with little direct economic benefit. As
Mark Wetherington suggests in his study of southeastern Georgia, poor farmers respected
slavery for its ability to elevate their own status within the state. However, poor whites
did not give unyielding support to slavery. Many plain folk feared the expansion of
slavery into the northwestern and southeastern regions because of the threat to cheap
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farmland and access to ranges for cattle.114 Despite the agreement about racial equality
among whites, tensions still developed over the role of planters and their influence. As
William Freehling explains in The Road to Disunion, the South suffered from attempts to
instill the idea of equality among whites, while planters held most of the political and
economic influence.115 In a larger sense, these antebellum tensions served as the
foundation for war-time disputes over the benefit of planters at the expense of plain folk.
Throughout the war, the early divisions between Georgians grew worse from the
increasing burdens of war.
The early war enthusiasm that the historiography contends swept throughout the
Confederacy failed to fully convince poor whites of the necessity of war. James
McPherson argued in his study, What They Fought For, 1861-1865, many Confederates
felt the desire to resist the perceived Union oppression. Indeed, many in Georgia did
volunteer for service but several regions throughout the state provided few troops to the
cause. In 1862, W.H. Byrd of Augusta complained to Governor Joseph E. Brown that his
attempts to raise a regiment in “this ‘Yankee City’” had failed. The Augusta Chronicle
and Sentinel confirmed Byrd’s frustrations when it declared that “one who walks Broad
street and sees the number of young men, would come to the conclusion that no war . . .
was now waging.”116 Throughout the state, other forms of resistance developed against
the newly approved acts of secession. Vigilantes under the command of Harrison W.
Riley threatened to seize the U.S. mint in Dahlonega and protect it from southern hands.
In Pickens County, the U.S. flag remained flying above the courthouse for several weeks
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after Georgia’s secession declaration.117 Although the concern for property and political
ideals did persuade many to enlist for the Confederacy, many regions throughout the state
held firm to their anti-secessionist ideals.
For Georgia, the problems of convincing poor whites to leave their homes and serve
in the military emerged in desertions during the first years of the war. In a report from
the Daily Columbus Enquirer two men from Macon were accused of leaving their
regiments and heading to Fort Monroe, held by Federal troops. The article produced
information on the two men, offering explanations for their behavior. “Kimball is a
tinner by trade, and professed to be a very sincere secessionist, but is really a hypocrite
and capable of any mean act; that Hempstead was a clerk in Macon, but a northern man
by birth. . .”118 By portraying the men as a hypocrite and a traitor, the newspaper
downplayed the possibility of working men refusing to continue in the war effort. By
mid-1862, despite numerous Confederate victories in Virginia, Governor Brown issued a
proclamation ordering all officers and soldiers of the state to be used for the
“apprehension of deserters and of officers and soldiers absent from their commands
without leave.” Brown urged that “Public opinion must, therefore, frown upon those
who, while in service, attempt to avoid their due proportion of labor and danger.”119
Planters did attempt to promote their own contributions to the war effort. In the Rome
Southerner, a report titled “A Wealthy Volunteer Corps,” proclaimed that the Floyd
Cavalry’s forty soldiers held property valuing $736,000. The article ended by suggesting
that “We venture to say that there are few volunteer companies anywhere as wealthy in
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proportion to numbers.”120 Planters did serve in various regiments throughout the
Confederacy. Their ability to acquire newer clothing and weaponry often distinguished
them from other men serving in the ranks. In a letter to his friend, Colonel Alexander
Hayes described his experiences as he led a Union regiment against Georgians at the
battle of Fair Oaks in 1862. He wrote:
Then our boys pitched in again and in 15 minutes the Georgians were on the road
to Richmond. The rout was complete. The quality, elegance, and taste of all their
equipment bore evidence that they were all scions of the first families among the
Georgian chivalry.121
These differences were not lost on the poorer Confederates and tension was evident
within the ranks of the Confederate army, as well. The presence of class tensions did
exist, notably in the relationships between officers and enlisted men. The paternalist
attitude that many wealthy slaveholders held towards their social inferiors carried over
into their commands.122 The flexibility of officers to deal with issues of dissension and
animosity allowed the Confederate forces to deal with direct class tensions, but the
growing burden on poor families would drive many soldiers to desertion.
At the start of the war Northerners seized on reports of fragile southern morale. The
Cincinnati Gazette printed reports that “Throughout Georgia, and some of the other
southern states, the people were very much discouraged with the operations of their new
government. . .” It continued:
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Alexander H. Stephens and others were constantly traversing the State, endeavoring,
by their speeches, to keep up the excitement against the North, and thereby to divert
their attention from their own sufferings.123
In 1862, the Philadelphia Enquirer published a report from a Georgia deserter who
claimed that “every man in his company will desert on the first opportunity that presents
itself.”124 Citing a lack of supplies and motivation, the article suggested that the soldier
gladly left his post in the southern army. The Wisconsin Daily Patriot stated that a
mutiny broke out in two Georgia regiments, ending with the shooting of six soldiers by
the commanding officers. The troops had grown irritated with the lack of pay in six
months.125 All of the reports centered on the growing pressure from the lack of supplies,
pay, and motivation. Although the accounts may have been exaggerated to display any
possibility of southern dissension, the articles show that, even to northern states, the
conditions of Georgia and its troops seemed to be growing increasingly desperate.
The accounts from Union newspapers reflect the initial belief by northerners that the
planter class of the South bore the responsibility of the conflict. According to Mark
Grimsley, this understanding influenced the Union’s early war military decisions to
pursue a policy of “conciliation.”126 Many military leaders including General Winfield
Scott and George B. McClellan argued that with firm military action and no abuses
against the poor civilians of the South, support for the war would decrease. Even
Sherman embraced these tactics in the early years of the war, but Grimsley is quick to
point out that this largely is the result of Sherman’s desire for military discipline and
morally responsible soldiers, rather than of his hopes for the strategic benefits of

123

Cincinnati Gazette, “Interesting News from Georgia and Virginia,” August 5, 1861.
Philadelphia Enquirer, “Arrival from Richmond,” June 12, 1862.
125
Wisconsin Daily Patriot, “War News,” April 2, 1863.
126
See Grimsley, 23-46.

124

48

executing a conciliatory policy towards the Confederacy.127 As the war continued into
1863 and 1864, however, Union military commanders became increasingly frustrated
with this policy as Southerners continued to refuse to surrender. It became clear that
avoiding any confrontation with poor whites throughout the South provided little benefit
to the Union war effort. The Union military eventually turned to “hard war” tactics,
despite reports of the pro-Union sentiment in states like North Carolina and Georgia.
An important factor that added to the growing tensions between poor whites and
planters was the desire to continue the profits gained from cotton during the war. By
1861, the Union blockade and the Confederate embargo on cotton sales resulted in
massive economic losses for planters throughout Georgia. Europe and the northern states
were the largest consumers of southern cotton and many planters hoped to capitalize on
the renewal of cotton sales as soon as the conflict ended. Planters throughout the central
counties of the Cotton Belt continued to plant cotton rather than food. To add to the
already difficult situation, the food supplies of the South suffered from droughts in the
years prior to the war. With the growth of cotton plantations in the 1850s, Georgia’s noncotton agricultural production within the central region of the state suffered.128
The refusal of planters to grow crops rather than cotton hindered the enthusiasm for
the war. Many poor whites already resisted the recent calls for volunteers in the
Confederacy. The concern over food supplies for their families worried soldiers in the
Confederate army. One soldier wrote to his local newspaper and pleaded “All that we
want for our watchful nights and life, is for them to stop the cry of hunger that comes to
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us from our families at home.”129 At the beginning of the war, planters often attempted to
aid their local communities through verbal or written bonds, yet little effort was made to
follow through on the promises. With most of the soldiers in the Confederate forces
coming from nonslaveholding households, many planters offered financial and personal
aid to families, only to fall short or withhold supplies as the war continued.130 In an
editorial titled “What Shall Farmers Do?” the author criticized wealthy planters and
warned that “the poor $11-a month soldier cannot always be at the rich planter’s side to
protect him in selling corn to his starving family at $5 a bushel.”131 The author urged that
attention be given to the growing reality of poor whites fighting for the war while
planters raised prices for families on the home front. The growing perception became
that of a war in which poor whites fought while wealthy slaveholders exploited the state.
As the war continued, the actions of planters brought increased attention to the perceived
shortcomings in the war effort.
As the food shortages became more apparent, various towns and counties issued calls
to planters urging them to aid poor families. An anonymous letter from Sumter County
called on planters from every county to “hold a meeting, and determine not to plant more
than four acres of cotton to the hand as a maximum . . .” The effect, the author argued,
would be a tremendous boost of confidence to the troops in the Confederate armies by
assuring them “of the amplitude of the provisions provided, not only for the support of
dear loved ones at home, but their own support.”132 To many, the refusal of planters to
grow food symbolized a fatal shortcoming in the war effort and a reminder of the
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economic differences between a “united” people. The Macon Daily Telegraph printed a
declaration on March 11, 1862, from the town of Perry. Stating that “the salvation of the
Confederacy” rested in the decisions of planters, the article suggested that because
Georgia possessed the agricultural capability and was free of direct warfare, the state held
the responsibility to provide as much food as possible for the nation. The article also
attempted to persuade planters of the economic benefits of planting corn by suggesting
that “In any event, corn and all edibles will bear a good price and find a ready sale; where
as if the war should continue, cotton can neither be sold, nor contribute anything to our
cause.”133
Despite the need for food to continue the war effort, most planters failed to
understand the dire situation developing throughout the state. Proclamations by
Governor Joseph Brown urged regions of the state to eliminate cotton crops and begin
growing food. In a letter to Linton Stephens, published in the local newspapers on March
7, 1862, Brown articulated his concerns over the unyielding production of cotton. Brown
wrote that planters who continued to ignore the cries for more food were subject to the
“charge of disloyalty to the South.” “No class of our society is so wealthy and powerful
as the cotton planters,” Brown argued, “and no other class has as much at stake.” Brown
put forth again the argument that losing the conflict would ruin any chances for profit
from the cotton. Furthermore, Brown contended that the numbers of acres given to
harvesting potatoes, beets, and grain needed to be doubled. He concluded by writing: “If
we do not, in my opinion, we are ruined.”134
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In an effort to provide relief for the state, Brown ordered that the General Assembly
approve measures to discourage cotton production. In November 1862, Brown’s
message to the state government explained his reasoning for a new tax on planters.
“Without a supply of provisions it is impossible to sustain our army in the field and
prevent the enemy from triumphing over us,” Brown wrote. He asked the General
Assembly to approve “a law imposing a tax on one hundred dollars upon each quantity of
seed cotton . . . over what is actually necessary for a home supply.”135 The state
legislature, largely consisting of planters, ignored the request. The legislature did
approve, however, a law stating that landholders were forbidden to plant more than three
acres of cotton for each slave or farmhand employed.136 In a published letter to the
citizens of the state, Brown discussed the potential threat against the state’s defense if
crops were not supplied. He wrote, “The army must be fed and their families at home
supported, or the sun of liberty will soon set in darkness and blood, and the voice of
freedom will be forever hushed in the silence of despotism.”137 For Brown, the lack of
crops forced a confrontation between the military needs of the state and the economic
profits of wealthy Georgians.
Despite Brown’s pleads, the production of cotton continued to increase and
eventually, the state government joined in making the problem worse by purchasing
cotton and exporting it themselves.138 According to his study, Stanley Lebergott states
that during the war, 6.8 million bales of cotton were grown during the war. Many
planters held onto their cotton with the hopes that blockade prices would offer a greater
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return and by 1865, 1.8 million bales remained for sale.139 Lebergott also argues that
planters continued with the growth of cotton, not only for the economic value, but for the
chance to avoid conscription as a large-scale planter.140 As planters avoided military
service and placed personal profit before aiding the war effort, animosity between
slaveholders and nonslaveholders continued to grow.
This was further exacerbated by speculators who inflated prices that made food
almost impossible to obtain. As planters continued to ignore the pleas for more food
production, prices throughout the Confederacy climbed as a result of the Union blockade
and scarce supplies.141 By 1862, speculators and planters throughout Georgia placed
economic gain before the interests of plain folk throughout the state. Consequently,
frustrations over the war mounted as poor whites observed the wealthy placing personal
gain before the interests of burdened families, as well as the Confederacy itself.
Speculators often based prices on the recent military and political events of the
Confederacy. By 1862, prices for food and supplies climbed after the shattering of
expectations that the war would be over quickly. With the lack of food being produced in
the state, prices for grain, bacon, potatoes, and beef reflected the fears of a prolonged war
and the greed of speculators to capitalize from the market.142 The Daily Delta from New
Orleans printed a portion of a letter found on the body of a Georgian soldier. In it, the
soldier complained of the growing prices of food and its effect on the morale of the
country. “We have tuff times here at this time. We are hard to get enuff to eat,” he
wrote, “a common steer, three years old, sells for twenty-five dollars. . .James, I tell you
139
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the people are getting tyred of this war hear. Union men are coming out everyday.”143
As the frustration over high prices and few supplies continued, the soldier witnessed a
growth in unionist sentiment. A report in the New York Herald criticized the “Beauties of
the Davis Despotism,” by reporting that bacon would reach $1.25 a pound. It observed,
“This, too, in the heart of Georgia, where the provisions are more abundant than along the
frontiers of the rebellion, where the armies and guerillas of Davis for two years have been
scouring the country and eating out or wasting its substance.”144
Poor whites throughout Georgia discovered that speculators represented the growing
inequality that they feared at the start of the war. Katie Cumming, a nurse serving in
Atlanta, observed that by 1863 speculators represented an almost insurmountable
obstacle towards victory. She wrote:
Dr. Young's indignation was so great against the extortioners and speculators . . .
He was bitter in the extreme . . . when we think of how he and others have given
up homes, friends, and every thing dear to them for the cause, and find such
Shylocks preying on the very heart-blood of our country; it is enough to make
even the "stones cry out." Dr. Young told us that our money was more depreciated
in Atlanta than in any place in the Confederacy. He said that for himself, "if the
Confederacy fell, he would think it an honor to sink with it and its money in his
pocket, rather than to have made his thousands.145
Governor Brown recognized the damaging effect speculators were having on the morale
of the state. He wrote to Alexander Stephens that “There seems to have settled on the
mind of our people a sort of feeling of despondency which is stimulated by the constant
croaking of a class of speculators,” he wrote, “These men put the worst face on every
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mishap of our arms. . . . They do all in their power to discourage our people.”146 As the
war continued, speculators and the rising prices of inflation appeared to many Georgians
as a serious threat to the already precarious social unity of the state.
From the start of the war, Brown and state legislators attempted to provide poor
whites with relief against speculators and the rising prices. As Governor Brown
suggested in his message to the Assembly in 1861, the easiest way to aid the white
families was to provide for the fair treatment in collection laws and ensure that property
was protected. The Stay Law of 1861 stated that speculators could not purchase the land
of poor debtors unable to meet collection demands. Brown explained his plan further:
This would enable a few heartless speculators, who happen to have funds
at their command, to buy up the property of poor debtors; and would cause
an immense amount of suffering among helpless women and children.”147
The passage of the Stay Law also coincided with the request that all property acquired
from speculators after the law be appropriated by Georgia troops.148 Brown presented
this act in the same message to the legislature which reiterated the need for all whites to
continue in the struggle. The “poor white laborer” had a vested interest in maintaining
the current struggle in order to preserve his place within the economic and social frame of
society.
In 1862, the General Assembly passed a law donating $100 to the families of soldiers
in the service of the Confederate armies. As Governor Brown stated in his message to
the session of delegates, “Many of these privates are poor men, who have left behind
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them large families dependent upon their own exertions for a livelihood.”149 Soldiers
received exemption from the poll tax and were excluded from paying a $1,000 tax on
personal property.150 By 1863, Brown attempted to again emphasize the importance of
both social classes depending on each other for victory in the war. In his speech, he
touched upon a point that would be referenced numerous times as the hostilities over
nonslaveholding casualties grew. He wrote:
…No class of our people has so much at stake, as our slaveholders, who
are generally our chief planters. They are dependent upon our white
laborers in the field of battle, for the protection of their property; and in
turn this army of white laborers and their families, are dependent upon the
slave owners for a support, while thus engaged. The obligation is mutual
and reciprocal, and neither party has the right to disregard it.151
As the war progressed into 1863 and 1864, states with war weary regions appropriated
increasingly large funds for civilians. In February 1864, the Virginia General Assembly
approved $1 million for “needy families of soldiers and sailors in the confederate service
from the state of Virginia, residing in counties within the lines or the power of the enemy
under the control of Union forces.”152 The journal from the House of Representatives in
Mississippi shows that the 1864 session consisted mostly of relief acts. State officials
heard proclamations for relief acts for individual families, businesses, churches,
government officials, and town leaders.153 The women of poor families attempted to
work for the Confederate government in various positions. The Confederate Clothing
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Bureau in Richmond employed women as seamstresses, with the low wage of thirty cents
for every shirt produced. In Georgia, poor women found work in Macon at the Georgia
Soldiers’ Bureau and the local arsenal.154 As jobs from Savannah moved towards the
central regions of the state in order to avoid the Union blockade and any threat of attack,
a report in the Savannah Republican questioned how poor women would continue. It
asked, “Cannot the work be distributed—a portion to Savannah as to other cities—and
thus help those whose condition is rendered dependent exclusively on the patronage of
the government?”155 With the war being fought in more areas throughout the
Confederacy, poor women faced the prospect of working in factories and arsenals to
supplement the little, if any, state aid.
In Georgia, like other states throughout the South, relief efforts for the families of
soldiers continued to be funded, despite the growing economic struggles. By March
1864, the relief fund for the families of Georgia troops, was approved at six million
dollars as compared to the one million dollar appropriation in 1861.156 By November,
another six million dollars was appropriated for relief. Brown even suggested that the
state needed to disregard any financial constraints to protect the welfare of soldiers’
families. He wrote, “The wealth and property of the State must be taxed to any extent
necessary to prevent the suffering among the families of our brave defenders.”157 Even
the education fund of the state was eliminated in order to provide more money for the
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families of fallen Georgia troops.158 Brown even pleaded with Davis to stop the
Confederate conscription officers from taking food and supplies from the poor regions of
the state. In his letter Brown wrote, “The little supplies of provisions in the hands of a
few is being seized by Confederate officers, leaving none to distribute to relieve those
likely to starve. If this continues the rebellion in that section will grow, and soldiers in
service will desert to go to the relief of their suffering families.”159
Throughout counties in the state, local relief committees worked to aid the suffering
of poor white families burdened by the war. Many of the committees formed in the early
years of the war, and fell under the direction of local women. But, as supplies ran out
and casualties climbed, more citizens in the central regions of the state tried to appeal to
the patriotic ideals of planters and families. In one article, the citizens of Sumter County
were asked by the relief committee, “I ask you whether the poor soldier has not given up
home, family, luxury, comfort—all the ordinary necessities of life? You know he has.
What for? For your protection, life, liberty, and property . . .”160 Another article warned
the citizens of Pulaski County that their failure to establish relief committees for their
troops was “discouraging them.” The author worried that the soldiers would return
home, only to say “I was in your own State fighting for your property, your liberty, and
all that is dear unto you, and was hungered and you gave me no meat . . .”161 Many
demands for relief centered upon the growing realization that the war benefited wealthy
planters but was being fought primarily by nonslaveholding whites.
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The General Assembly attempted to establish an effective system of transportation for
food and supplies to the mountainous counties within the state. Governor Brown ordered
the Superintendent of the State to put the best trains on a project to deliver food to the
southwestern portions of Georgia. Brown’s intention was to send corn and bread supplies
to “prevent if possible, suffering, on the part of the poor, or the families of soldiers, for
want of bread.”162 This legislation faced difficulties, however, concerning the use of the
railroad and other equipment as Confederate authorities had requested military control of
the railroads. A few railroads did ship corn to the poor families in the state free of
charge, but several others continued to ship cotton in order to obtain greater profits.163
Brown was forced to ask for further legislation that would require the Quarter-Master
General to confiscate the railroads.164 Transportation became another source of
frustration and resentment as economic conditions continued to decline.
As the threat of Sherman’s army grew, newspaper editorials attempted to discuss the
threats facing the invading forces. In a section titled, “The Crisis of the War,” the
contributor to the Macon Daily Telegraph predicted that the future campaigns by Federal
forces in 1864 would result in failure. The author asserted that Union military plans were
in a “exceedingly hazardous description, and if they are not fully frustrated, it will be due
solely, as we believe, to a lack of spirit and enterprise on the part of Confederates.”165
Later, newspaper accounts of Sherman’s impending campaigns often mocked the Union
intentions. One article discussed a letter sent by Sherman on May 23, 1864, “so as to
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‘prepare the people’ of Georgia,” but gave little consideration for any potential attack by
remarking, “if he even comes at all.”166 Southern confidence grew from accounts of
Sherman’s difficulties around Atlanta. Reports from the New York Herald were printed
in Macon, showing that northern journalists feared for the safety of Sherman’s troops,
claiming that, “nothing but the exercise of a real genius on his part can save his army
from disaster.”167
Attempts were made by journalists to develop the idea of sacrifice and determination
by Georgians during the Union invasions. In his study on the influence of the
Confederate media on public morale, J. Cutler Andrews argues that Confederate
newspaper editors largely promoted the hope and energy of the early years and continued
this optimism throughout the war. The growing internal disputes, however, influenced
the public more than the constantly optimistic editors.168 In the case of Georgia,
Andrews’ argument is valid in the sense that most editors throughout the state did not
print articles describing the dire military situations facing the South. The editorials
critiquing government officials, social inequalities in conscription, and the state’s
handling of relief efforts, however, displays the idea that morale in Georgia suffered early
on in the conflict.
General Sherman’s understanding of the South and its reasons for war influenced his
decisions in during the Savannah Campaign. According to his personal letters to friends,
politicians, and fellow military commanders, Sherman displayed a thorough
understanding of the class system existing throughout the southern states. Insisting that
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the South is divided into four classes of men, Sherman came to the conclusion that the
second class of “smaller farmers, mechanics, and laborers,” ultimately held “no real
interest in the establishment of a Southern Confederacy, and have been led or driven into
war, on the false theory that they were to be benefited somehow, they Knew not how.”169
As the war continued, Sherman anticipated a growing resentment from the class of
followers as the costs and sacrifices of war continued to accumulate. In a letter to Major
Roswell Sawyer, Sherman observed that “My own belief, is that even now the nonslaveholding classes of the South are alienating from their associates in War. Already I
hear crimination and recrimination. Those who have property left should take warning in
time.”170
By May 1864, Sherman’s advancement through the northwest region of Georgia
convinced him of the supplies available within the state. In a letter to his wife, Ellen, he
wrote that “The Country is stripped of cattle, horses, hogs, and grand, but there are large
fine fields of growing oats, wheat and corn, which our horses and mules devour as we
advance. . . .”171 From Sherman’s correspondence, the frustrations of poor whites are
justified. Despite the increasingly desperate situations of poor whites, Sherman’s
campaign succeeded due to the abundance of food and supplies in the central counties.
After the capture of Atlanta in September, Sherman and Grant discussed the next
movements for Sherman’s forces. Aware that the supplies through the state would
support his forces, Sherman convinced Grant that any movement away from Georgia
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would negate his recent victory in Atlanta. Furthermore, Sherman insisted that the
population needed to understand the burdens of war. He informed General Henry
Halleck that “The poor people come to me and beg as for their lives, but my answer is,
‘Your friends have broken our railroads, which supplied us bountifully, and you cannot
suppose our soldiers will suffer when there is abundance within reach.”172 The
importance of Sherman’s observations lies in the realization that his campaign would
produce further burdens upon an already dividing population. The “abundance” within
the state would come from the group of southerners whom Sherman believed had
followed the cry for secession. Sherman’s campaign would demonstrate to the
Confederacy that its armies failed to withstand the Union forces, while simultaneously
convincing the poor whites in Georgia that their desperate situation needed to be blamed
on the planters of the South.
The abundance of supplies that fed Sherman’s forces outside of Atlanta justified the
growing frustrations that poor whites held against the planters of Georgia. As the need
for food supplies increased with the Confederate army and the home front, the cotton
production for many planters continued. The state government under Governor Joseph
Brown could do little to stop speculators and the rising prices. By 1864, relief efforts
largely failed from the lack of supplies and many appealed to the planter class of the
central counties for aid. The realization that the war benefited the wealthy but asked little
sacrifice of them grew in the minds of poor Georgians. As Sherman prepared his forces
in Atlanta to continue the march, the growing discontent offered the Union army an
important opportunity to exploit the internal animosity of Georgians and effectively
remove the state from being a factor in the Confederate war effort.
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CHAPTER 4
“THEY MAY STAND THE FALL OF RICHMOND, BUT NOT ALL OF GEORGIA”:
SOCIAL ANIMOSITY AND SHERMAN’S MARCH
The Savannah Campaign signified a dramatic change in the understanding of military
tactics, as well as the war itself. By 1863, the Federal government recognized that the
naval blockade and campaigns against Richmond were not providing a timely end to the
war. Winfield Scott, George B. McClellan, Joseph Hooker, and other Union
commanders attempted to defeat the Confederacy through superior numbers alone.173
Early campaign strategies emphasized advancing upon Richmond with direct assaults and
overwhelming numbers of soldiers. Under General Ulysses S. Grant, however, the Union
military embraced a system of “hard war.” According to Mark Grimsley, this theory
centered on Union forces attacking and destroying the South’s war-making capabilities
through the use of raids and extended campaigns, in addition to attacking the Confederate
forces repeatedly and taking advantage of their numerical superiority.174 In the hard war
approach, the Union military focused on destruction of the agricultural, economic, and
military resources of the Confederacy, as a means of hindering the South’s ability to
wage war. Sherman’s Savannah Campaign is considered to be one of the most
significant examples of hard war tactics. By placing the campaign within the context of
Georgia’s social history, however, the implications of the hard war tactics employed
during the march go far beyond their destruction of the state’s military production
capabilities. Sherman’s march, while attacking the economic and industrial centers of
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Georgia, also succeeded in bringing further burdens to the already strained social unity of
Georgians.
In addition to destroying the Confederacy’s main source of weaponry, Union forces
also foraged in the rural areas of the state, creating heavier burdens on already suffering
poor whites. It became an attack on the fragile relationship between planters and poor
whites, many of whom now faced direct involvement in a war that increasingly favored
the wealthy. Sherman’s experiences in the South and his early campaigns had shown
him, first hand, that the South experienced divisions between wealthy and poor whites.
Through his correspondence, Sherman displayed a desire to exploit this internal
separation when he was presented the opportunity to do so in Georgia. In a larger sense,
the psychological impact of the campaign centered upon the already developing cracks in
the social unity of Georgia. With the removal of the Confederate forces into Tennessee
clearing the way for little resistance, Sherman recognized that a Union invasion would
only worsen the already tenuous relationship between wealthy and poor Georgians. The
organization and execution of the Savannah Campaign demonstrate that the Union
military recognized and acted upon the social strains of Georgians in 1864.
Early scholarship on the Savannah Campaign largely focused on tactics and
execution, with little consideration of the psychological effect on Georgians. Studies by
James Ford Rhodes and J.G. Randall in the early Twentieth century produced important
narratives that focused on the Union’s destruction of Atlanta and the surrounding
countryside as it related to the Confederacy’s military surrender.175 Ignoring the “Lost
Cause” interpretations of post-war southern accounts and relying heavily on political
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documents and military correspondence, Rhodes determined that Sherman’s troops had
little effect on southern civilians. Most of the destruction, he argued, resulted from
Confederate vandalism.176 The nationalist sentiment in Rhodes’ research continued into
the later work of J.G. Randall. Although he expanded Rhodes’ study by incorporating
important, albeit minimal, evidence from Confederate military and political leaders,
Randall still attributed the destruction of Sherman’s campaign to various factors. He
wrote, “Sherman’s campaign is neither to be praised nor used as a text for sweeping
generalization as to Northern barbarity. The offender was war itself.”177 Although these
studies provided important research into the narrative of the campaign, the experiences of
Georgians, notably how their understandings and perceptions of the war effort changed or
remained untouched.
The understanding of Sherman’s campaign changed with the developments in
historical research. To 1950, Civil War studies remained focused on the narrative of the
war, centering their research on government and military leaders. That changed when
Allan Nevins’ multivolume Ordeal of the Union provided a thorough discussion of the
social, economic, and cultural aspects of the war.178 Following Randall’s research,
Nevins contributed to the study of Sherman’s march by describing the reaction of
Southern leaders to the threat of Union forces in unprotected territory. However,
Southern civilians are largely absent from the narrative of the march; instead, the strategy
behind the campaign receives far more attention. More recent studies of Sherman’s
march have included a discussion of the social experience of Georgia’s civilians that
earlier studies failed to include. Joseph T. Glatthaar’s The March to the Sea and Beyond
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provides a vital perspective into the campaign by focusing on the experiences and
perceptions of Sherman’s troops.179 Other books by Mark Grimsley, Anne J. Bailey, and
Jacqueline Glass Campbell focus on new interpretations of Sherman’s campaign, ranging
from Union military strategy to resistance on the home front after the capture of
Savannah.180 Their research provides significant analysis of Sherman’s troops, the
Confederate home front, and the overall significance of the campaign into Union military
policy.
Although recent studies show interest in the experiences of Georgians during
Sherman’s march, the importance of southern social classes—as they relate to the history
of the march—remains a neglected field. Military narratives often include the
experiences of Georgia’s civilians only as a means of depicting the severity of destruction
to the state. The Georgian people are depicted and studied as a unified group.181 For
Sherman, social divisions served as an important factor into the planning and execution
of the Savannah Campaign. Sherman acknowledged a distinct separation between
southern planters and poor whites before even beginning the campaign. In Georgia, the
arguments over economic relief, conscription, and supplies created a significant division
between these two groups. Sherman’s campaign ultimately found its greatest result by
inflicting further pressure on already suffering poor whites.
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In order to understand the Savannah Campaign, it is important to recognize that the
march was not Sherman’s first experience with employing hard war tactics. In 1863, he
aided in the siege of Vicksburg under General Ulysses S. Grant and was put in charge of
a military force along the recently captured Mississippi River. With the intention of
developing a campaign that would eliminate guerrilla attacks on nearby Union troops,
Sherman embarked on the Meridian Campaign. With 25,000 troops, Sherman’s forces
destroyed railroads, seized livestock, and made the Mississippi region useless for
Confederate troops under General Nathan Bedford Forrest.182 The design of this
campaign was shaped by the knowledge that Sherman had of possible frustrations
developing within Meridian.183 In a letter to Major Roswell M. Sawyer, Sherman
declared, “Since I have come down here I have seen many Southern Planters, who now
hire their own negroes & acknowledge that they were mistaken and know not the
earthquake they were to make by appealing to secession.”184 Sherman continued in the
letter to suggest to Sawyer that the rich planter class and poor whites were not to be held
equally responsible for the war’s destruction. Sherman stated:
I believe that some of the Rich & slave holding are prejudiced to an extent that
nothing but death & ruin will ever extinguish, but I hope that as the poorer &
industrial classes of the south realize their relative weakness, and their
dependence upon the fruits of the earth & good will of their fellow men . . .”185
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Sherman’s letter to Roswell displays recognition of a distinct separation between the
planter and poor white citizen. He perceived the poorer class as being far too weak and
driven into “hasty action.” This also shows the early Union perceptions that not all
Southerners agreed with secession; many followed the partisan leadership of wealthy
slaveholders and politicians.186 Sherman dramatically suggested that “No man could
deny but that the United States would be benefited by dispossessing a single prejudiced,
hard headed and disloyal planter and substituting in his place a dozen or more good
industrious families. . .”187 The march to Meridian in late 1863 also allowed Sherman to
develop his unique theory of warfare. Historian Buck T. Foster writes, “The Meridian
campaign convinced Sherman that he could travel deeper into the Confederacy, wreaking
havoc on the interior, and thereby compelling the populace to end their fruitless support
for a dying cause.”188 In Sherman’s view, if the Union could make conditions unbearable
for the poor population of the South, the discontented faction would develop enough
pressure on southern leaders to end the conflict.
Throughout the South, the Union’s actions at Meridian became the topic of intense
speculation and discussion. For many, the rumors of Sherman’s advance caused great
concern. In her diary, Frances Woolfolk Wallace, the wife of a Kentucky lawyer,
described her possible trip to Meridian after Sherman’s campaign. She wrote, “Everyone
says our trip to Meridian will be trouble--roads very bad, the same Sherman and his army
passed over, houses all burned, have to camp out at night. The Torys and robbers are very
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numerous, hope we will get through safely.”189 From this description, Wallace displays
the realization that Sherman’s actions coincided with the emergence, or at the very least
continuation, of unionist groups and criminals. The military campaign not only brought
destruction to the homes and roads of Meridian, but left social chaos and desperation in
its wake. Newspaper reports throughout Georgia printed articles from the Alabama
newspapers in an attempt to obtain any information on Sherman’s actions. The Selma
Dispatch claimed that it “certainly is a magnificent Yankee programme. But a few weeks
will dispel this glorious dream of Yankee occupation.”190 It concluded by predicting that
“To an unmilitary eye, at least half of the 32,000 Yankees under Sherman—with “Mobile
or Hell” on their caps—will find a Confederate prison, or perhaps their next choice to
Mobile.”191 In another article, a report from the Mobile Register claimed that “Our
informant states that the enemy committed few depredations upon private property
beyond helping themselves to provisions.” The only property reported stolen in the town
of Quinman were night clothes and around 800 slaves.192 These articles downplay the
military significance of Sherman’s forces and the destruction they supposedly
implemented. In contrast to the rumors and worries discussed by Frances Wallace in her
diary, the southern newspapers attempted to minimize the destruction and even hint at
Sherman’s inescapable defeat.
Sherman’s Meridian campaign demonstrated his ability to distinguish between those
he felt were responsible for the war and the poorer whites, whose discontent he hoped to
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foment. Rather than engaging in total war tactics, his troops largely focused on the mills
and factories of the town, with the damage to private homes largely resulting from
foraging parties. For an invasion into enemy territory, the campaign displayed great
discipline and restraint. Sherman’s desire for order is often attributed to his preference
for military and moral authority.193 His actions after the capture of Atlanta further
support the idea that Sherman wished to bring the war to the homes of those Southerners
he deemed responsible for the conflict. In a letter to General Henry Halleck, Sherman
hinted at the large number of poor families, claiming that “The residence here of a poor
population would compel us, sooner or later, to feed them or to see them starve under our
eyes.”194 He then ordered all Southerners out of Atlanta, and responded to complaints
from Southerners with accusations that the Confederacy had failed to take care of its own
civilians. He wrote:
In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the
families of rebel soldiers left in our hands, and whom we could not see starve.
Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different. You deprecate its
horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and
ammunition, and moulded shells and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and
Tennessee. . .195
From his letter, Sherman argued that the Confederacy suffered from a detached
leadership. Southern elites, despite the continuing production of war supplies, did not
understand the realities of war. Their unwillingness to provide for the families of
Confederate soldiers only solidified the realization that wealthy Southerners gave little
consideration for the sacrifice being offered by poor soldiers. To Sherman, this
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symbolized a deep split in the understanding of the war, as well as unity throughout the
South.
Sherman’s statements in Atlanta established the two perceptions that would shape the
Savannah Campaign. First, Sherman continued to hold southern leaders and elites
responsible for starting a war that served only their interests. Southern leaders essentially
left poor whites to the mercy of Union forces, during a war that largely depended on
lower class whites to fight. Second, the military isolation of the state had allowed
Georgian elites to continue the production of supplies for the war effort. By striking
through the central region of the state, Sherman anticipated that he could end the
economic profits of the wealthy and simultaneously ruin the leadership of the southern
elites by placing greater pressure on poor whites.
Sherman’s forces demonstrated the potential impact of foraging on the countryside
during the capture of Atlanta. William King, a Georgian who lived outside of Atlanta,
described the harsh treatment towards the local families during the campaign. Insisting
that the Union troops “commit many wanton and cruel depredations, keeping alive those
bad feelings that will perpetuate this sad war,” King described a foraging party that
focused its raiding on the poor families outside of Atlanta. According to King, “A poor
family Mrs. Rogers &c. about 7 miles from here . . . she gave me a terrible account of the
sufferings of the families in her neighborhood from the Federal Foraging parties who are
constantly coming among them, taking every little thing could find, and very often what
was not wanted by them would be destroyed. . .”196 King continued by describing the
condition of life outside of Atlanta in September 1864. According to his experiences, the
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region became far too dangerous for travel. Union foraging parties, Confederate
deserters, and local guerrilla units persuaded many to remain at home. He writes:
I heard in town that Smith, one of the Ros'l [Roswell] factory Wagoners, had been
hung by our Scouts at Roswell for becoming a Union man, I cannot however
believe the report, if he is hung at all I am sure it must be from additional cause,
probably desertion . . . I learn that it is too unsafe for any one to try to go over to
Roswell, even with a government pass, from the Scouts, deserters &
Bushwhackers on the Way.197
Once the capture of Atlanta appeared imminent, King himself displayed great concern
over his son and the war itself. “How anxious do I feel about my little Boy, if I could
only hear that he was safe & well, how grateful would I feel,” King lamented, “What sad
anguish & anxiety does this needless political war occasion. What a curse to a Nation are
these professional Politicians.”198 As the sacrifice grew heavier, the realization of who
initiated the war emerged. Georgians like King began to recognize the disunity that was
present from the beginning of the conflict. As Sherman’s forces moved closer to
Atlanta, King again condemned the Confederate leadership as “miserable party
politicians [who] care but little who suffers so . . . generally are careful to place
themselves out of the way of danger.”199 King’s comments demonstrated the growing
frustration Georgians felt over the failure of the Confederate leadership and the
disproportionate sacrifice made by ordinary Southerners for the war effort that became
clear with the approach of Union forces.
King’s diary offers a useful insight into the horrors that faced poor whites along the
route of Sherman’s invasion. Although foraging parties inflicted little damage to the
property of poor families, the need for provisions often resulted in Union troops taking or
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destroying everything available. This desperate situation combined with the already
growing anti-Confederate sentiments throughout the region. Increasing numbers of
deserter and guerilla groups made the already dangerous situation worse for families.
The foraging by Sherman’s troops also coincided with a decline in southern morale from
General Joseph E. Johnston’s inability to withstand Sherman.200
One explanation for Sherman’s understanding of class in the South is that his
experiences in Louisiana prior to the war allowed him to witness the class structure in the
southern states. Prior to the war, he earned a reputation, like Ulysses S. Grant, for being
unsuccessful at numerous jobs. Upset at his failed attempt as a lawyer in Kansas,
Sherman accepted the position of superintendent at the Louisiana School of Learning.201
During his time as the superintendent, Sherman often attended gatherings with local and
state politicians, even going as far as to defend his brother, John Sherman’s, speeches as
an “abolitionist.” He convinced many around him that although he served in the state, his
first concern remained the defense of the Constitution, not slavery. In his memoirs he
wrote, “I mingled freely with the members of the Board of Supervisors, and with the
people of Rapides Parish generally, keeping aloof of all cliques and parties, and I
certainly hoped that the threatened storm would blow over . . . .”202 By the time of his
invasion through Georgia, the southern press published accounts of his past as a means of
creating the image of a traitor to the South. A report observed that “When it [war] broke
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out, he was president of a college in Louisiana, enjoying a large salary, and professing
undying devotion to the South, to its institutions, and to its people.”203
Sherman’s letters immediately following the Atlanta campaign demonstrate his belief
that poor southern whites could convince national leaders and military commanders to
end the conflict if pressured. In a message to Grant on September 20, 1864, Sherman
discussed in detail his plans for a possible Georgia campaign. He wrote, “I can start east
and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage to the State, but resulting in no
permanent good; but by mere threatening to do so I hold a rod over the Georgians who
are not over loyal to the South.”204 By placing the blame on the leadership of the
Confederacy, this military tactic succeeded in portraying wealthy and elite politicians and
planters as free from the burden of war, and largely responsible for the sacrifices of poor
whites. In a larger sense, Sherman remained convinced that any attack through the state
would result in a weakening of the poorer population and eventually strain the tenuous
relationship with the southern leadership. His sentiment was shared by others in the
Union military, particularly General Henry Halleck who argued for the implementation of
hard war tactics. Halleck argued that “We certainly are not required to treat the so-called
non-combatant rebels better than they themselves treat each other. . .We have fed this
class of people long enough. Let them go with their husbands and fathers in the rebel
ranks.”205
With the fall of Atlanta, the state government in Milledgeville faced a dire military
situation. With the coastal islands under Federal control, Sherman’s capture of Atlanta,
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and battles across the Florida border, the state no longer enjoyed the military isolation of
the early war years. Governor Joseph E. Brown’s decision to remove the militia units
from the battlefields after the fall of Atlanta sparked interest from Sherman, who
remained convinced that Brown wished to leave the Confederacy. Sherman recalled in
his memoirs, “I have not the least doubt that Governor Brown, at that time, seriously
entertained the proposition; but he hardly felt ready to act, and simply gave a furlough to
his militia.”206 Nevertheless, Sherman’s proposed meeting to discuss Georgia’s
independence caused anxiety among the Confederacy’s elite. Concerned over Sherman’s
proposal, Robert Toombs anxiously wrote to Alexander Stephens urging him to not “by
any means go see Sherman, whatever may be the form of his invitation . . .If Sherman
means anything, he means to detach Georgia from the Confederacy.”207 Governor
Zebulon Vance of North Carolina, worried that Georgia’s participation in the
Confederacy was wavering, contacted Brown to propose a conference that would address
the need to eliminate desertion in the armies. Aware of the fact that “The great evil of
desertion must be broken up, if possible; provision must be made to the poor. . .” Vance
called for a meeting of the southern governors in order to discuss how to avoid furthering
the damage to the states’ defense. Vance observed that “It would avoid much discontent
for every man to know that he was required to do only that which every one else has to
do, and that the burdens of the war are fairly distributed.”208 Eventually, Brown’s reply
to Sherman was printed in the local newspapers, stating Brown’s view that “as he is only
a General commanding an army in the field, and I the governor of a state, neither the
Constitution of his country nor my own confers upon us any power to negotiate a peace.”
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Brown further explained to Sherman that “Georgia may possibly be overrun but can
never be subjugated. . .”209
The anticipation of poor whites rebelling against government leaders was not the only
motivation for the development of the Savannah campaign. Correspondence by Sherman
after the fall of Atlanta in September 1864 suggests that Georgia’s economic capabilities
also remained a tempting target for further Union attacks. In a letter to Grant on October
9, Sherman rejected Grant’s suggestion of a possible occupation or shortened advance.
He wrote, “Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it, but the utter
destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. . . I can
make the march and make Georgia howl.”210

For Grant, the presence of numerous

Confederate manufacturing centers throughout the state played an important role in
legitimizing a military advance. The Columbus Iron Works and the local sword factory
made the city a prime target. The Augusta Powder Works and the several ordnance
factories in Macon supplied ammunition for Lee’s army.211 As Sherman explained to
Grant, “The possession of the Savannah River is more than fatal to the possibility of
Southern Independence. They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not all of Georgia.”212
Sherman hoped to convince Union leaders that not only would the campaign encourage
the possibility of Georgia’s removal from the Confederacy, but that the economic
advantages outweighed the risk.
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As Sherman prepared for his campaign throughout October 1864, northern
newspapers hinted at the precarious situation developing in Georgia. Reports
acknowledged the mounting pressure on Governor Joseph Brown and Confederate
President Jefferson Davis. Although most of the information regarding the Confederacy
was largely received through southern accounts, most of the articles reflected the
northern perception of a state with little desire or motivation to resist Sherman. The New
York Herald reported on November 11, 1864, “It is not even probable that he [Sherman]
will have to fight a battle . . . He has to make a march of three hundred miles through a
pleasant country, that his army can live upon if necessary. . .”213 The New York Times
printed reports of demoralized armies and the use of Confederate troops to catch
stragglers throughout the state as early as 1863.214 By September 1864, the newspaper
reported several articles on the exhaustion of the state and the numerous options Sherman
now had for inflicting massive damage. As Sherman prepared for the march to Savannah
news about the relative ease of passing through Georgia mixed with confusion over the
specific targets of his upcoming campaign was limited and many expressed concern over
possible failure.
Sherman’s march to Savannah officially began on November 15, 1864 as Union
forces evacuated the recently destroyed city of Atlanta. The 220 mile march required a
massive area of foraging for Sherman’s 60,000 troops. Consequently, the army was
divided into two columns under the command of Generals O.O. Howard and Henry W.
Slocum. After studying the census records of Georgia, Sherman organized the two
columns along different routes in order to hasten their progress through the state and to
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keep Confederate forces guessing as to their next target.215 Most of the counties from
Atlanta to Savannah fell within the plantation belt region of the state and offered a greater
supply of crops and livestock. The terrain did offer some difficulty, however, as the
counties surrounding Savannah, specifically Chatham, Bryan, and Liberty Counties,
contained mostly rice plantations and little support for Sherman’s forces.
Prior to the march to Savannah, Sherman established his expectations as to how the
campaign was to be carried out. In Special Field Orders No. 120, Sherman discussed the
restraint and discipline that Union troops were to exhibit during the campaign. In Section
4, it states that, “The army will forage liberally on the country during the march . . .
Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or commit any trespass;”216
Sherman again displays attention towards the separation between rich and poor with
Section 5 of the order. It states, “As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the
inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit;
discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and
industrious, usually neutral and friendly.”217 The stipulations offer a decidedly friendly
approach to the lower class of Georgia. As historian Mark Grimsley suggests, this again
reverts back to a “trinity division of the Southern population.”218 For many northerners,
the South entered the war under the direction of wealthy elites, with poor whites serving
in the army, and slaves constituting the labor at home. These sections of the order,
however, go against the sentiment expressed in Sherman’s personal correspondence, as
well as his actions in the 1863 Mississippi campaign. There is an underlying realization
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that despite official orders to leave lower class Georgians relatively untouched, the very
method of foraging relies upon acquisitions from the civilian population. In early 1864,
Sherman related the historic military example of the British army invading and occupying
Ireland, eventually with the result of expelling everyone out of various regions, as the
precedent for his style of warfare.219 Although the orders may have presented an official
restriction against the destruction of property held by poorer whites, the implementation
of campaign itself suggests that Sherman anticipated further hardships for the lower class.
Perhaps the strongest evidence that Sherman’s campaign was an attack on the social
unity can be derived by studying the foraging parties of the Union advancement. The
very act of foraging required the acquisition of supplies for the survival of the army.
Without proper military control, the groups could steal goods, supplies, and personal
property with little resistance. The ability of officers to control their men, however,
clashed with the missions that foraging groups were designed to carry out. In many
towns, officers struggled to maintain a presence of military discipline while ordering
troops to take crops, animals, and grain from struggling families.220 As Joseph T.
Glatthaar stated, “Vigorous control, the only solution to the problem, would have stifled
out the independence of the troops and detracted from the overall effectiveness of the
campaign, and probably would have endangered its success.”221
On her plantation, Dolly Sumner Burge encountered the terror of the Union foraging.
On November 15, Union troops entered her home outside of Covington. After stealing
her flour, butter, eggs, and wine, the soldiers placed a guard on her home to avoid any
internal damage. She wrote, “My eighteen fat turkeys, my hens, chickens, and fowls, my
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young pigs, are shot down in my yard and hunted as if they were rebels themselves.
Utterly powerless I ran out and appealed to the guard. He replied, ‘I cannot help you,
Madam; it is orders.’"222 Burge also expressed shock over the treatment of her slaves
when Union soldiers began “cursing them and saying that ‘Jeff Davis wanted to put them
in his army, but that they should not fight for him, but for the Union!’”223 Eventually, the
army passed leaving Burge “poorer by thirty thousand dollars than I was yesterday
morning. And a much stronger Rebel!”224 For some Confederate planters, particularly
women, the foraging parties became sources of increased animosity against the North.
Plain folk women, however, might have initially supported their husbands in the war
effort, but could hardly recover from such pillaging.225
In his diary on the march, Private George Sharland related his numerous experiences
with foraging. Often describing the campaign as a “rich feast” of food and jokes,
Sharland observed the foraging companies and their impact on the various towns and
cities. In one entry he wrote, “But shortly before dark, we passed through the town of
Jackson, the county seat of Botts [Butts] county, and went into camp, on the east side of
the same, having marched about twenty miles through a very fine country, containing
abundance of forage for man and beast, which was liberally appropriated for army
use.”226 He continued by discussing the various horrors that planters felt towards the
foraging groups. “The planters dread to see them more in this aspect of their warfare
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than any other,” he wrote, “as it entirely cuts off their hopes from the prospect of a next
year's crop, but such is the dreaded fortunes of war.”227 Although speaking about the
planters of Butts County, located in the central region of the plantation belt, his words
portray the drastic damage to the towns and farms. The abundance of food and supplies
suggests that plantations were not the only locations of Union foraging. Sharland
supported this when he observed, “It becomes a matter of surprise to the masses of
civilians, as to how an army of such proportions as ours, can daily prosecute its journey,
through an enemy's country . . . yet in doing so, we do not furnish provisions for much
over one half of what really belongs to the army. . . .”228 To Sharland, the army’s
foraging reached such proportions that it surprised the southern civilians, yet in his
opinion, the Union army could have taken or destroyed much more.
Sharland’s observation displays the Union sentiment that all provisions within the
state belonged to the Union forces. Foraging parties required northern troops to function
independently and combined the open-ended orders with an intense desire to punish the
Confederacy.229 Sharland closed an entry on November 30:
But I am safe in concluding that the country left in our rear daily, is pretty much
cleared of all it contained, leaving the inhabitants to conclude that they had
experienced a human plague, or at least, that some unusually ravenous creatures
had committed a general depredation, and passed on, without asking the privilege
or right of way.230
Sharland’s entries suggest that Union troops did little to differentiate between wealthy
and poor Georgians. Reports of food being scarce in the state went against the
experiences of many northern troops as they march toward Savannah. George Nichols,
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an officer from Illinois, discussed his confusion over the abundance of supplies. He
wrote, “We had been told that the country was very poor east of the Oconee, but our
experience has been a delightful gastronomic contradiction of the statement. The cattle
trains are getting so large that we find difficulty in driving them along.”231 To Nichols
and his comrades, the campaign represented a great change in the way of living for the
Union forces. In addition to the various vegetables and meats, Nichols wrote, “The mills
here and there furnish fresh supplies of flour and meal, and we hear little or nothing of
"hard tack" -- that terror to weak mastication. Over the sections of country lately
traversed I find very little cultivation of cotton.”232 For many Union troops, the campaign
signified a chance to eat well, whether at the expense of poor or wealthy Georgians.
Despite the increasingly dire situation facing the state, many newspaper editors
continued to portray the image of a unified southern home front. Even before the
Savannah Campaign, as the Union forces continued through the counties outside of
Atlanta, local newspapers throughout Georgia attempted to rally the citizens to the militia
units. The Macon Daily Telegraph claimed that Sherman’s forces would find “a lion in
the path” should they attempt to capture Macon.233 Proclamations from Richmond urged
Georgians to “fly to arms, remove your negroes, horses, cattle, and provisions away from
Sherman’s army. . .”234 An anonymous writer proclaimed that the Confederacy needed to
bring more men up from the positions that keep them from the front lines. In order to
accomplish this, “The newspapers and printing press could be suspended for a time. The
stores could be closed for a month and every man go to Hood’s army. By this means the
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army would be doubled within one week’s time, and could, within one month,
overwhelm Sherman.”235 For many poor whites, Sherman’s march presented a difficult
situation that required a decision between the sacrifice for national defense or the
protection of family. In the loyalist areas of southeastern Georgia, many men previously
resisted the call for national service. Deserting or remaining at home allowed poor
whites the opportunity to avoid a war they felt was unjust. With Sherman’s invasion,
however, these men now faced a serious threat to the safety of their families.236
With the Union forces penetrating deeper into the state’s plantation region, Sherman’s
columns attempted to deal with the growing number of slaves following its two columns.
Sherman described an incident with a group of newly freed slaves around the town of
Covington. After asking the slaves if they understood the war and how it was being
fought, Sherman informed them of his desire to have them remain at the plantations. “I
then explained to him [an elderly slave] that we wanted the slaves to remain where they
were, and not to load us down with useless mouths, which would eat up the food needed
for our fighting-men; that our success was their assured freedom.”237 With many
slaveholders leaving before Sherman’s troops arrived, slaves continued to follow the
Union forces. In a tragic event at Ebenezer Creek, General Jefferson C. Davis ordered
the pontoon bridge to be disassembled before slaves could cross the river. Confederate
cavalry under General Joseph Wheeler killed or captured all the men, women, and
children who did not drown attempting to flee.238 The incident demonstrates that the
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Union campaign placed a far greater emphasis on the industrial and psychological
destruction of the state, rather than the well-being of newly freed slaves.
As Sherman’s troops surrounded Savannah, the experiences of the march
demonstrated the drastically different experiences of planters and poor whites. In his
diary, George Nichols discussed his views of the planting class as his regiment moved
through the plantation belt of Georgia. He wrote:
In the upper part of the state, meeting with none but the poorer and more ignorant
class, I was led to believe that the rich and refined class had fled farther south;
but, although I have made diligent search for the intelligent, intellectual
aristocracy, I have met with failure and disappointment. There are rich men . . .but
their ignorance is only equaled by that twin sister of ignorance, intolerance.239
Nichols continued by describing the experiences between Sherman and some poor whites
on the march. He acknowledged that Georgia was split over the idea of secession but that
almost every civilian claimed to be a Unionist prior to their arrival. He wrote, “It seems
hard, sometimes, to strip such men so clear of all eatables as our troops do . . . but, as
General Sherman often says to them "If it is true that you are Unionists, you should not
have permitted Jeff. Davis to dragoon you until you were as much his slaves as once the
negroes were yours." By holding poor whites accountable for the actions of the state,
Sherman’s men succeeded in continuing the idea of social animosity.
As Sherman’s campaign ended in Savannah on December 21, 1864, the psychological
impact of the march focused on the economic and social disparities of Georgia. After the
capture of Atlanta, Sherman employed his prior experiences of hard war tactics with his
understanding of the social hierarchy of the South. Already knowing that the state
government possessed little enthusiasm for the Confederate government in Richmond,
Sherman understood that the internal unity of Georgia suffered from early contentions
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and that unity against the invasion would be minimal. With the campaign’s end, the
social stratification that appealed to the Union army intensified. As Sherman’s troops
moved into South Carolina in early January 1865, the effects of the Savannah Campaign
proved overwhelming for the Georgia home front.
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CHAPTER 5
“THEY ARE DOING AS MUCH OR MORE INJURY TO THE COUNTRY THAN
THE ENEMY”: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL DIVISION
AFTER SHERMAN’S CAMPAIGN
As Sherman’s forces entered Savannah on December 21, 1864, many soldiers
reflected upon the recent campaign. In a letter to home, army chaplain George S. Bradley
noticed that the southern newspaper reports downplayed the recent capture of the city.
“Well, they certainly have a happy way of looking at all their mishaps as ‘blessings in
disguise,’” he wrote, “But it will not go down with the masses at home . . . The people at
home will be completely discouraged, and the soldiers in the field will feel the same
when they hear of the destitution of their families.” Union soldiers like Bradley believed
that the devastation of Sherman’s march went beyond pillaging and foraging. The
Savannah Campaign, while bringing the harsh realities of war to the wealthy planters
located in the central region of the state, placed further pressure on poor whites
throughout the state. The march succeeded in raising social tensions by effectively
bringing attention to the perceptions of personal sacrifice, desertion, and blame for the
inadequate relief efforts. As Bradley observed, “the rebellion is fast tumbling to ruins.
Sherman is knocking the bottom out.”240
Bradley’s account suggests that the Union military understood the destruction in
Georgia to be more than just attacks on the state’s infrastructure. The psychological
effect that resulted from Sherman’s campaign brought anxiety to the defenseless home
front and concern to Georgian troops. Studies of the psychological implications of the
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Savannah Campaign are not new to the field, but placing the march within the context of
Georgia’ internal disputes and growing “enmity” expands the subject of psychological
warfare. As Sherman’s forces continued into South Carolina, the physical destruction
and psychological strain worsened the already strained unity between slaveholders and
nonslaveholders. Poor whites, within the central counties and throughout the state,
encountered an increasingly desperate situation. Union foraging had stolen precious
supplies from already struggling families and the army had requisitioned or destroyed the
crops that could have been used for state relief. Desertion rates in the Confederate forces
increased dramatically by the end of December 1864. As southern men returned home,
Unionist groups coerced Confederate conscription officers and stole supplies in the
barren regions of the state. The lasting effects of Sherman’s campaign demonstrated that,
while physical destruction to the state could be repaired, the damage to an already weak
social unity effectively ruined Georgia’s participation in the war effort.
As discussed in the previous chapters, the Savannah Campaign capitalized on the
early dissension over the understanding of the war and Georgia’s participation in the
Confederacy. Early political disputes regarding secession and state defense hindered
attempts to promote a unified national identity for Georgians. As the war continued,
frustrations over the 1862 Conscription Act, ineffective relief efforts, and the
continuation of cotton production in spite of diminishing food supplies convinced many
that the war effort lacked unity. This animosity hindered the war effort and aided the
Union military tactics of hard war. In preparation for the Savannah Campaign, Sherman
acknowledged the division developing within the state. With orders to differentiate
between wealthy and poor, Sherman recognized the continuing differences between
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Georgians on the home front. By late 1864, animosity within Georgia weakened the war
effort in the South’s most significant military contributor and served as a crippling
weakness to the Confederacy.
This chapter addresses the effect of Sherman’s campaign as it pertained to Georgia’s
worsening social divisions. After Sherman’s forces continued into South Carolina,
dissension throughout Georgia increased as wealthy planters and cities unaffected by the
campaign criticized poor whites for the lack of enthusiasm in the war effort. While poor
whites questioned the sacrifices of wealthy slaveholders during the early years of the war,
Georgians who possessed the means to withstand the economic and military burdens
publically criticized the increasingly desperate families and deserters for their apparent
lack of fortitude. The experiences of women throughout the state show that Sherman’s
march made difficult but not dire circumstances for wealthy families. The foraging of
Union troops changed the way of life for wealthy families but placed a dramatic burden
on the already desperate situations of poor whites. The drastically varying experiences of
women display the disproportionate burden of the war effort on poor families. Elite
women expressed their longing for new dresses and more entertaining social events;
families in the northern counties of Georgia sought refuge with nearby Union forces. As
the number of deserters and Unionists grew, many placed blame on the state government
and Governor Joseph E. Brown. For Georgians, the perception of incompetent leaders
resulted from the failures of relief efforts and the public arguments between the state and
national government. Despite his attempts at relief efforts, Brown faced public scrutiny
over his tendency to criticize the Confederacy and offered few solutions of his own to the
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growing desperation throughout the Georgia. By the end of the war, the divisions over
the war and the understandings of the war resulted in devastating weaknesses to the state.
Although Sherman’s campaign inflicted massive destruction upon the industrial and
agricultural holdings of the state, the experiences and perceptions of the March largely
depended on location, as well as economic status. The central counties that Sherman
missed along the plantation belt continued to operate with little regard for the struggling
counties in the northern and southern areas of Georgia. Newspapers in towns like Macon
attempted to portray a relatively positive atmosphere amidst the growing desperation of
the state. One article stated simply that “The warm bright sunshine of yesterday brought
out upon the streets an unusual number of people—the ladies availing themselves of it to
make calls and visit the merchants. . .”241 The newspaper printed the article as a means of
providing a positive view of the town during the last gloomy days of the Confederacy.
The Macon Daily Telegraph, however, printed few articles throughout 1864 and 1865
that acknowledged the rising social tensions, suffering by poor Georgians, or the
increasing desertions by Georgia troops. Macon, largely a manufacturing town
surrounded by the plantations of central Georgia, had a newspaper that continually put
distance between the city and the war by publishing articles that discussed the war in
other areas of the Confederacy. By offering a focused perspective of the war that often
ignored the immediate burdens of surrounding counties and cities, the Macon newspapers
displayed the narrow perception of the war that existed throughout the state.
As the Union army moved out of Savannah and into South Carolina, Georgians
recognized the worsening disputes throughout the state. An issue of the Macon Daily
Telegraph questioned the observations of an Augusta newspaper that published reports
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claiming, “Sherman has several times, we are told, openly said neither he nor his army
are fighting to abolish slavery.”242 A Macon editor argued that Sherman’s statements
were fabricated to control the morale of his army and establish the possibility of
reconstruction once the war ended. Ideas of reconstruction were “needed to sow and
nourish sentiments of reconstruction in the South, creating dissentions among, whereby it
is hoped to weaken us. . .”243 During the march, Sherman bypassed Macon and Augusta,
heavy industrial cities and both vital to the Confederate war effort. Yet, despite the
similarities between the two cities, different interpretations of Sherman’s intentions
emerged. The report from Augusta regarded Sherman’s statements as proof that the
Union forces were not waging a war against slavery. The editor from Macon, however,
perceived Sherman’s words as a method of developing the animosity between
slaveholders and nonslaveholders. If Sherman maintained that the Union forces cared
very little for slavery, he essentially ruined the arguments used by planters to hold
together a society divided by class.
The different explanations offered by the Macon and Augusta newspapers display a
division that existed from before Sherman’s troops left Savannah for South Carolina.
Between November and December 1864, the foraging by Union troops forced many
families to cope with little food and no means of production. While some wealthy
families still possessed the means to survive, others holding just enough provisions to
make it through the war found themselves with little food or supplies. In his diary,
George Sharland, a private in the 64th Illinois Infantry, wrote on December 7, 1864 that
“The most serious aspect of affairs within the border of rebellion, that stares the
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intelligent observer in the face, is the large number of widows and orphans that are left
within the blighted pale of desolation, with gaunt famine staring them in the face. . .”244
Despite the poverty of some women, many others displayed intense animosity towards
the invading forces. Influenced by wartime propaganda and anxiety over the safety of
their loved ones, many women voiced their resistance and patriotism to Union troops.245
By the end of the campaign, Sharland held a more critical view of southern women. He
later asked in his diary, “So far as the women are concerned, we might as well spare our
pity, for they are the worst secessionists, and why should they not suffer?”246
As suggested by Sharland’s observation, not all women in the state met the Union
invasion with staunch resistance. The way in which women handled the Union invasion
largely depended on their economic status and physical location. In the central counties,
many women experienced the intensive foraging and pillaging of Sherman’s columns.
The Cotton Belt counties, however, were home to many planting elites. For many
women, the March did decrease the amount of supplies for wealthy families. Their
condition afterwards, however, did not equal the desperation of poor whites in the
northern and southern counties. Mary Ann Jones, a plantation mistress in Liberty
County, wrote about the aftermath of Sherman’s march. “To obtain a mouthful of food,
we are obliged to cook in what was formerly our drawing room,” Jones wrote, “and I
have to rise every morning by candlelight before the dawn of day, that we may have it
before the enemy takes it from us. . .”247 Jones discussed several visits by Union soldiers
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between December 15 and January 5. During each of these encounters, Union troops
took personal property and the majority of her food, but still left enough for her and the
family. While Jones suffered the emotional trauma of repeated Union visits to her
property, her family still possessed enough food to avoid starvation. She still held
enough personal possessions that Union troops visited her property. Like many
plantation mistresses, Mary Ann Jones suffered from the emotional trauma of Sherman’s
foraging but did not face complete starvation.
Wealthy southern women in other regions of Georgia continued with their lives and
experienced little direct effect from Sherman’s troops. A young girl at the time of
Sherman’s invasion, Eliza Andrews described in her diary the social events in Macon as
she spent time with her oldest sister. Largely untouched by the war, Andrews described
attempts to get to her home town of Washington, Georgia, located near the South
Carolina border. She wrote, “Father keeps writing for us to come home. Brother Troup
says he can send us across the country from Macon in a government wagon, with Mr.
Forline as an escort, if the rains will ever cease. . .”248 The discussion, and in a larger
sense even the possibility, of personal travel between family members suggests that in
January 1865 Andrews and her family were not desperate or concerned about supplies.
Describing an upcoming party, she wrote, “Mrs. Stokes Walton gave a big dining—
everybody in the neighborhood, almost everybody in the county that is anybody was
invited. I expected to wear that beautiful new dress that ran the blockade and I have had
so few opportunities of showing.”249 The experiences of women in the central counties
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and those of the northern and southern regions exposed the dichotomy emerging in the
state. For many, the disproportionate burdens became extreme by 1865.
The importance of the observations made by Andrews and Jones during late 1864 is
in their descriptions of how they withstood the added pressures of hard war. For Jones,
the location of her plantation resulted in Union troops confiscating her food and stealing
personal possessions from her family. She admitted that food was available, despite the
foraging from Sherman’s troops. For Andrews, the war seemed to do little in terms of
interrupting the continuation of social events or traditions. Both women possessed the
means necessary to survive the war. As Sherman’s campaign ended and the war burdens
increased, poor whites grew frustrated with this drastic difference in situation.
The differences in social class continued through the wartime experiences of women
throughout Georgia. Although the direct social changes to her life were minimal, Eliza
Andrews did notice the growing anti-Confederate sentiment permeating the state. Even in
a region untouched by the war, the threat of raiding from deserters and unionist groups
remained a possibility. In one entry, she describes how a Confederate soldier briefly
visited her sister’s home. Eventually, the soldier related that he was from the same
county in Georgia and “promised to do his best to keep the raiders from getting to us.”250
As Sherman’s forces continued into South Carolina, Georgians struggled to direct
blame on someone for the desperate conditions seen throughout the state. By late 1864,
privations from the months of warfare forced many poor white women to riot and steal in
order to provide for their families. Reports from Early and Miller counties, located in
southwestern Georgia, claimed that women and children were guilty of stealing local
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livestock. In the Early County News, the editor threatened to publish the names of the
women if the stealing continued. In the same article, another planter from Miller County
claimed that “They are now acting as they always would have done, had they the
opportunity.”251 The Macon Daily Telegraph reported that in Miller County, fifty women
“claiming to be soldiers’ wives,” used axes to break into the county depot at Colquitt.
The editor asked “Wonder why is it that soldiers’ wives are reduced to the necessity of
thus providing for themselves? Would not the proper authorities do well to look into the
matter?”252 The reports of the desperate women establish how the conditions in the state
hindered social unity. In the descriptions, blame is placed on the poor women for
behaving “as they always would have done,” and on the state government for its failure to
provide relief. Rather than establishing efforts to aid suffering families, the newspaper
accounts offer blame and criticism.
As poor whites struggled to withstand the Union forces in the state, local newspapers
directed anger and frustration at the lack of patriotism and support. During the Atlanta
Campaign, many poor whites attempted to save their property and homes by informing
the invading Union forces that they were supporters of the Union. Poor families in the
northern counties around Atlanta attempted to convince Sherman’s army that they held
strong anti-Confederate sentiments. After the March, many in the plantation belt held
strong animosity against these families and groups. The Macon Daily Telegraph argued
in January 1865:
Of all the mad delusions which ever entered the head of the crack-brained, the
ignorant, and the timid, none equals in absurdity that entertained by a few persons
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in the South—namely: that it would be possible, under any circumstances to save
property by affiliation with the Yankees.253
The editorial questions the motive and reasoning behind offering support for the Union.
Rather than recognize the possibility of strong unionist sentiment in the northern regions,
the author remarks on the certain failure of aligning with the Union. The newspaper
accounts from Macon suggest that poor whites received blame and criticism rather than
aid against the increasingly desperate conditions.
The article continued to hint that its intended audience was not the planting class of
the state. If the Union forces prevailed in the war, the state was determined to “sink into
slavery,” using threats of racial chaos to convince poor whites of the seriousness facing
them. The article claimed that the Union government would soon demand payment for
the war debts, and “It would take more than we possess to repay their debt, and the most
traitorous tory in the South would find himself despoiled equally with the truest hearted
patriot.”254 By arguing that all southerners would be subjected to Yankee rule, the article
attempted to convince poor whites of the racial hierarchy that would emerge while
simultaneously attempting to scare Georgians still loyal to the Confederacy. This
argument displays an interesting strategy of appealing to the fears of both groups of
civilians. Through this, Sherman’s idea of creating a growing presence of anti-southern
sentiment succeeded. The article attempted to subdue the anti-war supporters by
reintroducing the racial justifications of the war and suggesting that the state would be
unified through its shared punishment if the Union proved to be victorious.
The growing disparity between wealthy and poor Georgians was exacerbated over
concerns that planters still placed personal profit before the war effort. Even in early
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1864, as Sherman’s army approached Georgia from the north, many farmers still refused
to grow crops in place of cotton. Calls still went out for planters to organize and
contribute more to the war effort. The Daily Columbus Enquirer published a letter
discussing the recent call for a meeting by the Confederate Commissary. Planters in
Muscogee County, as well as the surrounding areas outside of Columbus, were urged to
attend in order to “secure concert and cooperation among the producers [planters].” Led
by General Howell Cobb, the meeting displayed the serious difficulty Georgians faced in
providing for the army and gaining personal profit for crops, cotton, and other supplies.
The newspaper reminded planters that “The Government has soldiers in the field fighting
for the defense of this wealth, and these soldiers must be provided for, or all is lost.”255
Despite these appeals, planters who were not directly affected by Sherman’s
campaigns continued to place personal gain before the war effort. Cotton production
throughout small towns in the plantation belt continued. Towns like Griffin, south of
Atlanta, produced 440 bales in September 1864. As part of Sherman’s “Christmas
present” to President Abraham Lincoln, Union troops confiscated 25,000 bales of cotton
in Savannah.256 With Sherman’s acquisitions in Savannah, it is evident that cotton
production continued even as many women and families in the poor regions of northern
and southern Georgia struggled to survive. The Augusta Constitutionalist published a
report from a commissary agent in Atlanta who claimed that “the suffering for food is
absolutely heart rending.” He went on to explain that his headquarters “almost constantly
thronged with women and children begging for bread. . . During the late freezing
weather, females walked as far as sixteen miles in the mud and ice, for the purpose of
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getting a meal. . .”257 As the description shows, Sherman’s idea of the poor encountering
an increasingly desperate situation was realized while the perception continued of a
planter class unaware of internal struggles in the state.
As the riots and starvation continued, pressure developed against the state officials for
their perceived lack of attention. In an article titled “What Will Georgia Do?”, A.C.C.
Thompson, a surgeon from the 3rd Georgia regiment, described the situation facing many
Georgia families. Acknowledging that troops in the field became discouraged by
desperate letters from home, the author asked “In view of this critical state of affairs,
would it not be wise for the people to demand through their State Legislatures, or
Conventions, that the Central Government should take some immediate steps to meet the
approaching difficulties with such measures as will save us from utter ruin?”258
Thompson suggested that the troops in his regiment “were not whipped” and that the only
factor leading to the army’s demoralization was the inability of the home front and state
government to fully support the war effort. To the men in the army, the political
ineffectiveness of the state resulted in poor families facing even greater desperation. In
order to “see the people wake up to a proper sense of duty and bring all of our available
means,” Thompson even suggested that the country develop a “constitutional hereditary
monarchy” as a way of obtaining the means necessary to avoid northern rule.259 For
Thompson, the frustration against the state government resulted from the inability of the
government to provide for struggling families. Although not directed at Davis, this
“latent enmity” emerged from disappointment in the state government.
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By 1865, Governor Joseph Brown received most of the blame for the state
government’s inability to provide for poor Georgians. Prior to Sherman’s march, Brown
had attempted to deal with the growing difficulties in providing relief that faced the state
government. In November 1864, Brown asked the state legislature to appropriate six
million dollars for the relief of soldiers’ families. Appealing to a sense of unity that was
not present in the state, Brown suggested that it was the duty of “those at home to see that
their families do not suffer from the necessaries of life.”260 The relief money, however,
did little to alleviate families from the rising prices of speculation. Individual counties
became responsible for the relief money and corn distribution, with local judges
supervising the distributions.261 Even the proposed legislation that offered each county
its own relief officer met with opposition. One newspaper editorial questioned Brown’s
decision by arguing that the system was subject to corruption. Any distribution officer
that failed to follow the wishes of his superiors would be punished by being reported to
the conscription enrollment officers.262 Brown requested another two million dollars for
a clothing fund for the Georgia troops. A cotton tax was offered, although not passed by
the General Assembly. Believing that the war could continue on indefinitely, Brown also
suggested that every state, north and south, send delegates to a convention. From this,
each state would have the ability to decide which nation to join. Since Georgia seceded
from the United States, Brown assumed that southern states possessed the right to remove
themselves from the Confederacy. As Brown argued, “In a crisis like the present
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Statesmanship is even more important than Generalship.”263 The call for a state
convention after the campaign confirmed Sherman’s belief that Brown’s frustrations with
the national government would worsen with an increasingly desperate populace.
Sherman’s march brought attention to the myriad of problems that Brown failed to
resolve. In his message to the General Assembly in February 1865, Brown claimed that
only three hundred of the ten thousand Georgia troops in Confederate service were in the
state during the invasion.264 Brown’s early war fears of a national government seizing
control of a state’s militia and leaving them defenseless were realized. Despite numerous
calls from Georgians across the state, however, he still refused to authorize the use of
slaves as soldiers, insisting that “I am quite sure any attempt to arm the slaves will be a
great error.”265 He continued by arguing that “When we arm slaves, we abandon slavery.
We can never again govern them as slaves, and make the institution profitable to
ourselves or them. . .”266 Despite the threat of military defeat for the Confederacy,
Brown resisted the calls to arm the slaves on the basis of being disastrous to the profit of
the institution and state’s rights. To many, the state government’s inability to accept
responsibility for the Union invasion or the desperate conditions throughout the state
continued to build frustrations. The Governor’s message to the State Legislature received
harsh attention from the local newspapers. In Macon, an editorial criticized Brown’s
insistence that Davis was to blame for the state’s military situation. The author went as
far as to suggest that “The effect of this message over the country will be to make
Georgia a term of reproach. Even now, in Virginia, Georgians are ashamed of their
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state.”267 Continuing to blame Richmond, Brown closed his message by arguing that the
states of Kentucky and Missouri enjoyed the benefits of the Confederacy while offering
nothing in direct taxes. His proposal to remove the representatives of Kentucky and
Missouri from the Confederate Congress met with animosity and frustration throughout
the nation. In a letter to the Macon Daily Telegraph, a Kentuckian wrote that Governor
Brown’s message criticized the loyalty of two states, while his own remained in doubt.
He wrote:
I should esteem it base and ungrateful to them[Kentuckians] in the extreme to
impugn their State because of those who remain at home shirking their duty, and
because of the probability that but for a difference in geographical position, your
State to-day has been less united and less determined in purpose than that of
Kentucky.268
For Joseph Brown, Sherman’s campaign realized the deep fears Brown held for
the safety of the state. After continually begging Jefferson Davis to provide more support
for the state’s defense, Brown’s urgent calls went unfulfilled due to a lack of soldiers and
political animosity. Even after the campaign, Brown continued to defend his actions
regarding the militia. In a letter to Secretary of War Seddon, Brown wrote, “Thus
‘abandoned to her fate’ by the President, Georgia’s best reliance was her reserve militia
and State Line, whom she had organized and still keeps, as by the Constitution she has a
right to do. Without them much more property must have been destroyed. . .”269 He
continued by arguing “Had some officials labored as successfully for the public good as
they have assiduously to concentrate all power in the Confederate government . . . the
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country would not have been doomed to witness so many sad reverses. . .”270 According
to Brown, Georgia’s military vulnerability resulted from the constant attempts of the
Confederate government to remove all authority and power from the states. In a larger
sense, Brown’s arguments with Davis and the numerous secretaries of war in 1861 were
justified.
The public perceptions did not agree. An editorial from Macon described the effect
that Brown had on the men serving in the Confederate ranks:
Some persons think that your [Brown’s] course has done more to promote
desertion than have any other dozen causes combined. If you have been
constantly sewing [sic] the seeds of distrust and disaffection in and out of the
army, then permit me to suggest that it would be more magnanimous in you to
take the responsibility, than to charge it upon others.271
The article demonstrates the intense frustrations felt by regions untouched by the war.
Between 1863 and 1865, Macon’s newspaper printed various critiques of Brown and his
arguments with Davis. In the early years of the war, few in the Macon press printed any
disagreements with Brown’s policies. As the war effort crumbled throughout the state,
towns like Macon questioned the political decisions in an effort to explain why the state’s
defenses failed. By questioning Brown’s impact on the soldiers, the Macon press
attempted to place blame on the governor for the desertion levels. In many ways, their
argument proved valid. Georgia troops in the Confederate armies grew impatient with
Brown’s inability to relieve the desperate areas of the state. As one soldier wrote to the
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governor, he felt “unwilling to fight longer for a country that will not protect our helpless
families.”272
As the tensions between wealthy and poor Georgians continued through the later
years of the war, desertion became the strongest form of resistance for poor white men in
the military. Fear, frustration over the war effort, and concern for struggling families
convinced many southern men to leave their regiments. From the first days of the
conflict, the Confederate armies suffered from desertion. In mid-1863, General Robert E.
Lee informed President Jefferson Davis that “The number of desertions from the army is
so great and continues to such an extent that unless some cessation of them can be caused
I fear success in the field will be seriously endangered.”273 In Georgia, as in most of the
Confederacy, many of the soldiers came from poor families. As the threat to families and
food supplies increased from Sherman’s invasion through the northern counties,
Georgian troops deserted in high numbers. Historian Mark Weitz suggests in his study
on desertion among troops from Georgia that “From late 1863 through 1864, the will of
Georgia’s soldiers to continue fighting gave way to a higher duty to home, particularly
those from the Upcountry and upper Piedmont regions of northern Georgia.”274 The
effect of Sherman’s march through the counties of the plantation belt, however, resulted
in a lower number of desertions than in the battles outside of Atlanta.275 This difference
resulted from the difference in the economic and social status of Georgians in Sherman’s
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path. The central counties contained a higher number of planters and fewer
nonslaveholders than the northern and southwestern counties of the state. What
historians like Weitz fail to address, however, is that the perceptions of desertion
weakened the relationship between wealthy and poor Georgians in the remaining months
of the war. While many poor whites went back to families in the northern and southern
regions of the state, many wealthy communities along the plantation belt now renewed
their calls for courage and sacrifice in the face of the enemy.
For many poor whites, the urge to desert the Confederate ranks increased
dramatically with the Union army’s attack on Atlanta in the summer of 1864. In an
attempt to drive the Confederate forces under General John B. Hood out of Atlanta,
Sherman elected to destroy the city’s supply lines by attacking the railroads. In late July,
Sherman ordered that Union artillery units target the wagon routes and railways into
Atlanta.276 Despite his attempt to cut off the Confederate supply lines, Sherman
understood that Hood’s forces still foraged from the countryside. As the siege continued
into September, both armies acquired their food and resources from the already
struggling northern counties of Georgia. After Sherman captured the city, Hood’s
decision to continue into Tennessee resulted from the threat of desertion to the army. As
General P.G.T. Beauregard wrote in December:
To pursue Sherman the passage of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have
been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a devastated country,
affording no substance or forage, and moreover it was feared that a retrograde
movement by the on our part would seriously deplete the army by desertions.”277
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To coincide with the intense foraging on the desperate counties of Georgia’s northern
regions, the Union military policy towards deserters transformed into an effective tool to
undermine the southern war effort. In 1862, the Union military held to a policy that
insisted all deserters and prisoners of war be held until they swore allegiance to the
United States, after which they could travel to the North or return to their families.278 As
the war continued into its third year, General Ulysses Grant argued that Confederate
prisoners of war be held, as a way to deplete the southern armies. Deserters, however,
were offered monetary rewards and transportation home, if their families resided in
Union-occupied areas.279 For many poor Georgians in the Upcountry of northern
Georgia, Sherman’s forces allowed them an opportunity to return safely.
The actual numbers of Georgia desertions demonstrate that as Sherman’s forces
moved through the state, the location of families and their economic status influenced
how often troops left the ranks. Between July and December 1864, 1,121 Georgians left
their ranks for the Union lines.280 Of this number, only 179 left in October and
November. By December, the number decreased again to 106. This demonstrates that
the earlier campaign against Atlanta resulted in a larger number of desertions in Georgia.
The northern counties, where resistance and frustration over the war continued to
strengthen as the war went on, experienced much higher desertion rates than the central
plantation counties.281
Disappointment and anger with the state government emerged as a factor for
desertion before Sherman’s campaign. By 1864, Confederate soldiers who did stay
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received little, if any, monetary compensation as the war continued. A published report
in Macon stated that many soldiers who visited their Quartermasters and paymasters were
met with clerks informing them that money was unavailable. The article asked, “Why
should these poor fellows, who have borne the ‘heat and burthen of the day,’ be turned
away without their just compensation, while the eleventh hour men, mostly at home. .
.manage somehow to get money, not only for necessary, but for luxurious expenses?”282
The location close to home and the lack of money convinced many soldiers to desert the
ranks.
As troops deserted, the threat of being captured by Confederate authorities existed in
the counties and towns of northern and southern Georgia. As early as 1863, reports of the
growing number of deserters and “Tories” appeared in state newspapers. The Columbus
Daily Enquirer wrote that conditions in White County were becoming unsafe. “The state
of affairs in that section is said to be very bad . . . It is hoped the authorities will send a
sufficient force there to clean them out, root and branch.”283 In an attempt to eliminate
the roaming groups and strengthen his depleted militia units, Governor Brown offered a
pardon to the “very considerable amount of deserters and stragglers” hiding from the
Confederate forces. Brown declared that the deserter groups represented a threat to the
state when he wrote “numbers of these deserters, encouraged by disloyal citizens in the
mountains of Northeastern Georgia, have associated themselves together with arms in
their lands and are now in rebellion against the authority of this State and the Confederate
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State.”284 According to Brown, the growing unrest in the northern counties weakened
their defenses against the Union invasion by encouraging desertions and resisting
Confederate political and military authority.
As Sherman’s forces left the state, the Confederate army attempted to capture the
increasingly large number of deserters. Orders from General Joseph Wheeler, the
commander of the Confederate cavalry under General Hood, stated that missing soldiers
would “be returned to their proper commands under good officers” as soon as possible.
Wheeler’s order addressed the early war frustrations of poor whites who felt the officers
and commanders of the newly formed regiments were unable to lead. Wheeler continued
by stating that those missing men who “committed depredations upon citizens” would be
punished immediately.285 Governor Brown also called all militia over the age of fifty to
“arrest and send forward deserters and stragglers.”286 According to the Confederate
military, the deserters were not the only ones guilty of hindering the war effort. Colonel
I.W. Avery of the 4th Georgia Cavalry stated that any citizens “who have been depredated
upon are requested to send me full particulars, including names, dates, places,
circumstances, etc.”

Avery’s actions also struck at the desperate families associating

with guerrilla groups. He ordered that “Under all circumstances citizens must refuse to
purchase stock from strange soldiers, and report them to me. Citizens who buy stock are
parties to the theft. . .”287 The possible aid and support from civilians throughout the
counties exacerbated the problem. The deserter groups in the northern counties did not
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pose the only threat. In a status report from August 1864, Brigadier-General John K.
Jackson described the threat of deserters and loyalists from Georgia in the northern
counties of Florida. He wrote:
Many deserters from the armies of Virginia and Northern Georgia . . . are
collected in the swamps and fastness of Taylor, La Fayette, Levy, and other
counties, and have organized, with runaway negroes, bands for the purpose of
committing depredations upon the plantations and crops of loyal citizens and
running off their slaves.”288
When the Confederate military did respond to the growing threat, the troops stationed in
the northern counties did little to suppress the desertions or unionist groups. As
Confederate conscription officers attempted to requisition supplies and men, the constant
battles against the deserter groups often created further violence and animosity. A report
from the Macon Daily Telegraph argued that the men under General Joseph Wheeler’s
cavalry “are really doing as much or more injury to the country than the enemy.”289 After
an inspection in January 1865, Brigadier-General A.W. Reynolds sent a message to
General Howell Cobb informing him of the difficult situation facing Confederate
authorities in the northern counties. According to Reynolds, many of the troops “have
been induced to join these regiments under the promise that they should not be disturbed,
and have the privilege of remaining at home. These several commands are mostly
unarmed.” Reynolds urged that “They ought not to be sent to General Hood . . . and the
facilities and inducements for desertion being greater, I have no doubt a majority of them
would either leave or go over to the enemy.” By early 1865, anti-war sentiment extended
beyond the northern counties and thwarted the ability of the state and national
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governments to effectively reinstate deserters or gather supplies. With the prospects of a
military victory quickly ending, the state’s troops felt little urgency.
Despite the perceived lack of enthusiasm for the war effort, Reynolds closed his
message by stating that throughout his tour, he found “no signs of disloyalty” from the
civilians.290 Although Reynolds’ description states that poor whites remained loyal, the
desperate situation in the northern counties by early 1865 suggests that Reynolds’
comment relates to the lack of active resistance. The anti-war sentiment continued into
the previously enthusiastically loyal counties of the state. Previous supporters of the
Confederacy organized loyalist meetings.291 A report in the Macon Daily Telegraph
observed that “There are numerous persons in Macon—in southwest Georgia, and the
rich cotton growing sections of the South Atlantic States, who, of late, talk as though they
were whipped and are glad of it.”292 The author attempted to bring attention to the
growing discontent in the previously enthusiastic regions of the South, regions that
largely benefited from the war. The article continued by observing that “The poverty
stricken refugee, the disabled soldier, the gallant achievers of our victories, the patriotic
gentleman who has nothing to lose but his honor, and the women—do not talk in this
strain.”293 By describing various supporters of the war effort, the article attempted to
establish the presence of active loyalists throughout the state.
Attempts to control Unionist sentiment often became violent, particularly when under
the control of the Confederate army. In November 1865, Sidney Andrews, a veteran of
Sherman’s army, reflected upon the condition of Unionists during the war. According to
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Andrews, “While the country was under the control of Johnston and Hood, the Union
men suffered almost every conceivable wrong and outrage. Their families were turned
out of their doors, their wives were abused and insulted, their daughters were maltreated
and ruined, their farms pillaged and desolated, their houses sacked and burned, and they
themselves were imprisoned and tortured. . .”294 Andrews’ reflection, although possibly
exaggerated, suggests that Confederate frustrations against Unionist groups often only
worsened the situation. By attacking already struggling families or individuals,
Confederate authorities only hindered the already low morale throughout the regions.
By March and April 1865, the attempts to subdue the active resistance against the
unionist groups seemed to be taking effect. The Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel reported
that under General Rosecrans, the deserters and tories throughout northern Georgia were
being apprehended.295 It reported again on March 25 that the possibility of another
Union attack forced the units in the region to threaten the civilians. The article stated,
“Our troops in that section openly threatened to destroy all the property of those who are
suspected of sympathizing with the enemy in case they again advance.”296 The Southern
Watchman in Athens reported that the situation in the northern counties improved by
April 1865. The article stated, “The country is now perfectly quiet—tories all driven out,
and no scenes of bloodshed.” It did suggest that the desperate conditions of many
families still remained. According to the author, “We regret to state that stealing horses
and other property is still very common. This evil has grown to such proportions that
many persons will find it very difficult to get their crops cultivated.”297 Although the
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direct attacks on Confederate officials seemed to be decreasing, the desperation for many
Georgians remained.
With the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia in April 1865, the last major
Confederate resistance was eliminated. For the state of Georgia, however, the internal
divisions created insurmountable weaknesses for the state government and the military
well before the official surrender of the Confederacy. Through the growing disparity
over the experiences and burdens of war, Georgians faced great difficulties in uniting the
population. Anger towards the actions and perceived lack of enthusiasm for the war
caused many Georgians to view struggling families with disdain. Many directed
animosity and blame towards the state government and Governor Joseph Brown for the
inability to provide relief, capture deserter groups, and for constant public criticism
against President Jefferson Davis. This chapter contributes to the scholarship of
Georgia’s wartime experiences by examining the specific difficulties encountered after
General William T. Sherman’s Savannah Campaign. By observing the military,
economic, and social problems of Civil War Georgia, the Savannah Campaign represents
a significant attack into the larger weaknesses of the Confederacy. Although recognized
as an impressive march through the heart of enemy territory, Sherman’s campaign also
symbolizes a Union attack that exploited the lack of unity and understanding of the
Confederacy and the southern war effort.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
On January 7, 1865, the Macon Daily Telegraph printed an editorial addressing the
dangers facing the country. In a rare acknowledgement of the realities developing in
Georgia, the article suggested that the social division that emerged in the initial years of
the conflict had effectively hindered the state by 1865. “The seeds of discord were sown
at an early period of this unparalleled contest,” the article stated, “They have germinated,
and the fruits are now appearing. A spirit of bitter controversy—of crimination and
recrimination—is beginning to be developed, and ‘dissension, distraction, and division of
sentiment and aim,’ are indeed beginning to lead, even in our infancy, to political
death.”298 Animosity between slaveholders and nonslaveholders emanated from disputes
over secession, the Confederate war effort, and the increasingly disproportionate sacrifice
being made by poor whites. The events in Georgia leading into the March to the Sea
demonstrate that Georgia’s internal divisions weakened the state’s ability to remain an
effective contributor to the war effort. Sherman’s march did not occur as a solitary event,
but rather within the worsening social conditions of the South’s largest and most
industrially productive state.
By viewing Sherman’s March within the context of Georgia’s social divisions, it is
evident that internal support for the Confederacy suffered from the beginning. The
“latent enmity of Georgia” emerged not after Sherman’s campaign in 1864, but as early
as the political discussions of secession in 1860. Previous historiography addresses the
political disputes, but views them in the context of a political battle over the
understanding of state’s rights. Although the correspondence between Governor Joseph
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Brown and President Jefferson Davis relates to Georgia’s role in the Confederacy, the
documents imply a larger struggle to maintain the satisfaction of both poor and wealthy
Georgians. As resistance to the Confederate service developed, Brown attempted to
satisfy both groups by keeping troops within Georgia and forcing the Confederacy to take
Brown’s selected officers. Urging Davis to consider the many threats facing the state,
Brown succeeded in creating a strained relationship with the Confederate War
Department and used this conflict with Richmond to place blame on Davis for the state’s
conditions in 1864.
Despite Brown’s failed attempts to foster unity for the war effort, the state still
provided more supplies and soldiers to the Confederate military than any other southern
states. Yet, regions of the state still remained unconvinced. Wealthy planters continued
to grow cotton despite the desperate need for military and public aid. The prices of food
and supplies rose quickly through the work of speculators. Through deployments in his
early military career, as well as the Meridian Campaign in late 1863, General Sherman
recognized the divisions between poor and wealthy throughout the South. Georgia’s
social tensions, made visible by the public disputes between Brown and Davis, convinced
Sherman of the increasingly desperate conditions in the state.
As General Ulysses Grant established the need for hard war tactics, Sherman’s
observations of the South aided in the development of the Savannah Campaign.
Although historians have studied psychological warfare and its impact on the Savannah
Campaign, the effect on Georgians shows that the effects went beyond the fear of
invasion or destruction. The planters located in the Cotton Belt of Georgia did anticipate
his campaign with great anxiety. The greater impact, however, came from the increased
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stress it placed on the already tenuous relationship between wealthy and poor Georgians.
Poor families, already desperate from the lack of supplies, faced greater burdens while
some wealthy planters still maintained a sense of pre-war life and luxury and were
unmoved by the hardships of their poorer neighbors. Animosity also developed from
Georgians relatively untouched by the war, as the reports of poor whites going to Union
forces for aid angered many people in places like Macon. Desertion rates and the number
of guerilla units rose dramatically after the Savannah Campaign as the war’s cost and
family desperation convinced many poor whites to return home.
After the war, Sherman wrote in his memoirs that he considered the March to the Sea
to be of less significance than his campaign through South Carolina. “Were I to express
my measure of importance of the march to the sea, and of that from Savannah
northward,” Sherman wrote “I would place the former at one, and the latter at ten, or
maximum.”299 While the campaign through the Carolinas may have appealed to
Sherman’s idea of “punishment” for the South, the Savannah Campaign represents a
greater attack on the internal condition of the Confederacy. The social damage to the
state, and ultimately the Confederacy, proves that Sherman succeeded in his attempt to
“make Georgia howl.”
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